Ali Fuat Yılmazer, then Director of Section C of the Intelligence Department, was sentenced to aggravated life imprisonment by the Istanbul 14th Assize Court for the offence of ‘Premeditated Murder’ in accordance with Article 82/1-a of the Turkish Penal Code for the murder of Hrant Dink. On the other hand, the 2nd Criminal Chamber of the Istanbul Regional Court of Appeals first overturned the sentence of 4 years and 6 months for ‘Falsification of Official Documents’ and then acquitted Yılmazer of that offence as a result of subsequent proceedings.
The accusations against Ali Fuat Yılmazer are varied and complex. They include allegations that he neglected his duties and responsibilities as Head of Section C, that he set up and managed an illegal bureau, that he was involved in intelligence reports, that he tried to have Ahmet İlhan Güler removed from his post, that he was linked to Assistant Intelligence Officer (AIO) Erhan Tuncel and the perpetrator Ogün Samast, that he was responsible for Dink’s protection, and, most importantly, that he was associated with the Gülen movement (‘cemaat’), referred to by the Turkish government as ‘FETÖ’, and that he committed this murder on behalf of this alleged terrorist organisation. In this analysis, we will examine each one of these allegations in detail and discuss the defence of Yılmazer and the background to the allegations.
In a nutshell:
Allegation: Accusations against Yılmazer include neglect of duty, management of an illegal bureau, involvement in intelligence reports, attempting to remove Ahmet İlhan Güler from his position, connections to Erhan Tuncel and Ogün Samast, failure to protect Dink, and associations with the Gülen movement, designated as a terrorist organization by the Turkish government.
Sentence: Ali Fuat Yılmazer was sentenced to aggravated life imprisonment for ‘Premeditated Murder’ but was acquitted of ‘Falsification of Official Documents’.
1) Intelligence Reports Mismanagement
Alleged failure to enter crucial intelligence into the Target Persons Programme; countered by stating information was already in the Intelligence Evaluation Project.
With regard to Ali Fuat Yılmazer, the Court’s judgment maintains that two F/4 reports, dated 13 October 2005, showing that Yasin Hayal harboured hatred against Armenians and would carry out an attack in Istanbul, and dated 15 February 2006, showing Yasin Hayal’s intentions to kill Hrant Dink, were sent by the Trabzon Provincial Security Directorate to the Intelligence Department, but that this information was not entered into the Target Persons Programme and that the necessary preventive measures were not taken.
It should be noted that this matter, which relates to the internal running of the data collection and archive system of the Intelligence Department, is not directly related to the issue of Dink’s protection. There are other higher legislations determining the responsibilities for protection and the details of protection procedures are contained in various other regulations and by-laws. In other words, the discussions concerning negligence in the protection of Dink should be assessed within the framework of the primary binding legislation, such as the Regulation on Protection Services, and not within the framework of the Targeted Persons Programme, which has a legal basis in the form of a circular.
As the Intelligence Evaluation Project (IEP), the general archive of intelligence, had some deficiencies in terms of archiving mechanisms, the need to develop a new programme/interface emerged. In this context, the programme was developed and implemented during Ali Fuat Yılmazer’s office as Deputy Director of the İKK Branch of the Intelligence Department between 1999 and 2001. The Programme is only used to facilitate searching of archives. It is also intended to make accessible data that are difficult or impossible to access in general archive searches and that are not included in the Intelligence Assessment Project. The main purpose of the programme is not to register official documents that fall within the scope of the Intelligence Assessment Project (IAP) in the Target Persons Programme. It is to make issues such as terrorist organisation documents, testimonies of members of terrorist organisations, publications of threatening content of terrorist organisations, etc. searchable within the scope of the archive examination carried out within the scope of the IDP project. The 2001 and 2002 circulars also explain the purpose and use of the programme as such.
As for the Dink case in specific, the data in the official letter of the Trabzon Intelligence Branch Directorate dated 17 February 2006, which contains the information in the news reports in question, had already been entered into the Intelligence Evaluation Project. In other words, the records related to Dink were already available in the IDP project. If there was any information ( i.e. terrorist organisational documents, publications, etc.) about Dink that was not included in the official letter, then it would be necessary to enter data into the Target Persons Programme. Therefore, there was no reason to enter data into the Target Persons Programme.
2) Concealment from Superiors
Accused of not submitting vital reports to superiors; denied based on evidence showing reports were submitted to a deputy during Yılmazer’s absence.
It is alleged that Ali Fuat Yılmazer did not submit the said news reports to his immediate superiors Vedat Yavuz, Necmettin Emre and Sabri Uzun, that he concealed such information from them, and that this led to the hindrance of the protection measures that should have been taken by the Intelligence Department.
Ali Fuat Yılmazer was abroad on 18-22 February 2006 together with Sabri Uzun, the head of the Intelligence Department, and some other officials. Yılmazer never saw the news reports and the official letter in question. He was accused of not submitting the reports to his superiors, which he had not seen and which had not been communicated to him.
Furthermore, the handwritten note ‘submitted’ on the news reports in question was used to make it appear as if the report had been submitted to Yılmazer, which is not true. In fact, the ‘submitted’ notation was added by Yılmaz Angın, the C2 Bureau Chief of the ISP at the time, after a meeting he had with Tamer Bülent Demirel, who was deputy chief of C Branch while Yılmazer was on leave, and indicates that the report was submitted to Demirel. Angın’s statement on this subject during his interrogation at the prosecutor’s office reads as follows:
Yılmaz Angın: As far as I know, there is no separate file opened in the C Branch for Yasin HAYAL. The document related to the investigation dated 17/02/2006 with reference number 027246 was delivered to my office on the same date, which was a Friday when I was on duty. The following day or the first working day, I noticed a note on the document that said, “Let’s discuss if there are any issues not addressed to Istanbul,” and I understood that this note belonged to Tamer Bülent DEMİREL, the Deputy Director of Intelligence Directorate C Branch, from his handwriting. I called Tamer Bülent DEMİREL from the internal phone and told him, “This is an employee report, and he has informed Istanbul Intelligence Branch Directorate about the meeting with the Trabzon employee in the letter numbered 20066102724851.” We reached a consensus that there was no need to write a new letter, and I noted on the document, “The issue has been shared with Istanbul with number 2066102748.” The “submitted” text just below this note in my handwriting means that this matter and the note I wrote were conveyed to Deputy Director Tamer Bülent DEMİREL by phone, he said. FURTHERMORE: Due to the different writing style in the text “The issue has been shared with Istanbul with number 2066102748” located just below the “submitted” text, he was asked again; I wrote the above-mentioned letter on the same day, and both texts belong to me. I added the “submitted” part after the phone conversation, he said.
Demirel also confirmed this during his interrogation at the prosecutor’s office:
Tamer bülent Demirel: I saw this letter and its attachments. I examined this letter, signed by Trabzon II Police Director Ramazan AKYÜREK, along with the F4 report dated 15/02/2006 and numbered 09 sent from Trabzon by my colleagues at that time, and I made necessary notes on the letter. Therefore, this document was submitted to me. I do not remember whether I submitted this document to the branch director or not.
Furthermore, while the statements of the Head of the Intelligence Department, Sabri Uzun, and Deputy Heads Yavuz and Emre, that the document had not been presented to them, were accepted as truthful, Yılmazer’s statement was not considered to be true, even though there was clear evidence to substantiate it.
3) Role in Tuncel’s Downgrading
Allegations of involvement in downgrading Tuncel’s status; countered by the timing and responsibilities of Yılmazer’s roles, highlighting a lack of direct involvement.
It is alleged that Ali Fuat Yılmazer played an active role in the process of the Trabzon Provincial Security Directorate’s request to the Intelligence Department (IDB) for the downgrading of Erhan Tuncel’s Auxiliary Intelligence Officer (AIE) status in November 2006 and the approval of this request by the Department. It is also alleged that during this approval process, Yılmazer was aware of and authorised the deduction of the IHE, which was allegedly under the knowledge and follow-up of the branch under his responsibility. Again, it is alleged that such a response given directly by the head of the CAO is not in accordance with the rules and procedures of administrative correspondence, and that this approval could not be expected to be granted without the knowledge and approval of the Intelligence Branch, of which Yılmazer was the head and which was responsible for the IED in question. Furthermore, although it cannot be determined precisely by which unit the reply letter was submitted for approval, since the archive documents could not be identified, it is claimed that the unit that provided this approval with its pre- and post-procedures should be accepted to be the branch headed by Yılmazer.
As it is evident from the document dated 17 November 2004 and signed by Ramazan Akyürek, who was Trabzon Provincial Police Chief at the time, Erhan Tuncel was made an auxiliary intelligence officer under the code name Mehmet Kurt in 2004. On 2 December 2004, Trabzon’s request was approved by Sabri Uzun, Head of the Intelligence Department, and Erhan Tuncel was registered as a probationary employee. In March 2006, Tuncel was moved from the probationary phase to the category of permanent intelligence officer. Yılmazer, who was on duty in Şanlıurfa province between 2001 and 2005, was not informed about Tuncel’s initial recruitment.
As for the dismissal of Tuncel, a report dated 16 November 2006, stating that no performance could be obtained from Tuncel, was written by the Trabzon Intelligence Branch officers. Upon this report, an official letter dated 17 November 2006 signed by Reşat Altay, Trabzon Provincial Director of Security, was sent to the ISB stating that Tuncel had been dismissed as an employee and that he was to be removed from the records. On 23 November 2006, Trabzon Security Directorate was notified by an official letter signed by Ramazan Akyürek, Head of the Intelligence Department, that Tuncel had been removed from personnel records.
As can be clearly understood from the official documents, Yılmazer had no role or responsibility in the recruitment and dismissal of Tuncel.
However, it is alleged that since Yılmazer was the Director of Section C during the termination of the recruitment process, he had to have knowledge and, more importantly, approval of the termination of the recruitment process. First of all, it should be noted that the decision to remove Tuncel from the police force was taken by the Trabzon Provincial Security Directorate. The role of the Intelligence Department is to remove Tuncel from the records of the Directorate. The approval mentioned in the allegation does not relate to the decision to dismiss Tuncel for lack of efficiency, but rather to the decision to remove him from the records of the Directorate. On the other hand, if it is claimed that the decision to dismiss is an important argument in determining responsibility in the murder case, it is clear that the personnel of the Trabzon Provincial Directorate of Security who made the decision to dismiss would be responsible for this, not the personnel of the Intelligence Department who made a routine removal from the records. However, it should be noted that Reşat Altay, who was the Trabzon Provincial Police Chief at the time and who signed the official letter dated 17 November 2006 containing the decision of dismissal and sent it to the Intelligence Department, was acquitted.
4) Link to Dink’s Murder
Claims that Tuncel’s downgrading led to Dink’s murder; challenged by the lack of direct evidence and the speculative nature of the allegations.
It is stated that as a result of the downgrading of Erhan Tuncel’s status as a AIP, no more news would be received from this source and that the action taken was to ensure the actual commission of the murder of the target person. According to the allegation, Yılmazer was aware of the consequences of this downgrading and was aware that the removal of Erhan Tuncel from the status of a AIP created a situation that would lead to the murder of Hrant Dink.
The argument that the removal of Erhan Tuncel from the status of Assistant Intelligence Officer (AIE) was directly related to the murder of Hrant Dink is far from being realistic and contains serious errors of logic on certain fundamental points. Firstly, Yılmazer’s duties and responsibilities at the time clearly demonstrate that there was no direct interaction or decision-making process to support these allegations. Intelligence processes are conducted through a multi-layered and extensive teamwork, and it is inconceivable that a single individual can influence the entire process. Furthermore, the linking of Tuncel’s removal from the status of a AIE to the murder of Hrant Dink is unfair to the routine procedures and decision-making mechanisms within the intelligence and police organisations. This allegation is a retrospective inference following the incident and ignores the real-time dynamics and complexity of the events. Therefore, the allegation that Yılmazer acted deliberately in this process and deliberately created a situation that led to the murder does not correspond to the facts and available evidence and is speculative. Such allegations impede a proper understanding of the incident and undermine the process of identifying the real perpetrators and the real causes of the incident.
5) Collaboration with Akyürek
Accusations of special cooperation with Ramazan Akyürek; refuted by the lack of concrete evidence beyond professional interactions.
It is alleged that Yılmazer was in contact with Ramazan Akyürek and that within the scope of this co-operation, he joined with Akyürek in all the purposeful actions.
Ali Fuat Yılmazer was the Director of Branch C of the Intelligence Department between 2005 and 2007. Ramazan Akyürek, on the other hand, served as Trabzon Provincial Security Directorate between 2003 and 2006 and as Head of the Intelligence Department between 2006 and 2009. Therefore, between 2006 and 2007, Akyürek and Yılmazer worked together in a hierarchical structure in the same department. The argument that Ali Fuat Yılmazer was in special contact with Ramazan Akyürek and that he participated in certain actions within the scope of this collaboration, as alleged, harbours serious logical discrepancies. Firstly, no concrete evidence has been presented to support the existence and nature of such collaboration, other than the official relationship required by duty. It is inevitable that professionals working in intelligence and security organisations are in routine contact with many different individuals and units, both with their colleagues and in the course of their duties. This is a common occurrence, especially between persons in different positions and units, and it is unrealistic to assume that such communications automatically indicate collusion or improper actions.
Moreover, the allegation of a special co-operation between Yılmazer and Akyürek ignores the fact that both men acted within the scope of their professional and legal responsibilities. Both men fulfilled their duties within the framework of specific legal and administrative rules. There is no information, document or testimony to the contrary.
Finally, this allegation is based on a simplistic and misguided interpretation of events and relations and does not adequately reflect the true complexity and the multidimensionality of the process. Such a simplistic approach is highly misleading in understanding the true nature of the case and demonstrates a lack of fair assessment. Therefore, the allegation that Yılmazer was in special collaboration with Akyürek and that he participated in certain actions within this context is no more than a speculative assumption made without sufficient evidence and concrete documentation.
6) Surveillance of the Murderer
Allegations of monitoring the murderer through connections with Muharrem Demirkale; denied due to lack of evidence and the speculative basis of the claim.
It is also alleged that the perpetrator Ogün Samast, who had been surveilled by Trabzon intelligence until the last moment, travelled to Istanbul two days before the murder and was followed by Muharrem Demirkale, who was allegedly involved in the coup attempt in 2016. On the day of the murder, it is alleged that the perpetrator was followed by Demirkale at the scene of the murder. It is also stated that Ali Fuat Yılmazer had a pre-existing acquaintance with Demirkale. According to the allegation, the persons who were following Ogün Samast, the perpetrator of Hrant Dink’s murder, were acting under the orders and command of Muharrem Demirkale. It is alleged that Yılmazer was involved in the organisation and management of this pursuit due to his contact with Demirkale. It is also alleged that 10-15 minutes after the murder of Dink, a phone call was made between Muharrem Demirkale and Yılmazer, in which they exchanged information about the murder.
At the time of the incident, Muharrem Demirkale was working at the Istanbul Gendarmerie Intelligence Unit and Yılmazer was working at the Police Intelligence Department in Ankara. Yılmazer and Demirkale had worked together in Şanlıurfa in the past and had worked together professionally, but only knew each other professionally and superficially.
Firstly, the allegation that Ogün Samast was being followed by ‘Trabzon Intelligence’ and that this information was known to Ali Fuat Yılmazer contains a serious logical contradiction. The allegations suggest that Yılmazer was aware of Samast’s movements and was involved in the surveillance process. However, this claim is inconsistent when Yılmazer’s area of duty and responsibilities are taken into account. While Yılmazer was on duty in Ankara during this period, the allegations concerning Samast’s surveillance in Trabzon and his subsequent movement to Istanbul were handled within the framework of the responsibility of the Trabzon Gendarmerie Intelligence units. The fact that Yılmazer was aware of and influenced these local operations must be considered as a situation outside his duties and authorisations. Furthermore, there is no evidence or allegation that shows Yılmazer’s relationship with Trabzon Gendarmerie Intelligence.
Secondly, the allegations that Muharrem Demirkale was following Ogün Samast in Istanbul and that this process was known or directed by Ali Fuat Yılmazer are not supported by concrete evidence and have not been brought to a clear conclusion in the course of the trial. The main reason underlying this allegation is that the negligence and responsibility of Trabzon Gendarmerie Intelligence, and in particular the Gendarmerie official Ali Öz, have been revealed in the murder case. There is no direct relationship between Yılmazer and Öz. This led to the fictionalisation of Yılmazer’s contact with Demirkale in order to place him at the centre of the case. Although the allegations attempt to portray this connection as an important and influential element, this approach is based on an unrealistic ground and is not supported by concrete evidence. Such efforts to link Yılmazer to the case amount to speculative assumptions that complicate the understanding of the actual events and responsibilities. Therefore, these allegations need to be carefully scrutinised and assessed in a realistic perspective, as in a fair trial every allegation must be supported by concrete evidence and objective analysis.
On the other hand, such an allegation misinterprets the professional relations between Demirkale and Yılmazer, ignoring the context and the real dynamics of the events. The professional acquaintance between Yılmazer and Demirkale must be considered within the framework of the normal working relationship of two professional intelligence officers. The allegations seek to portray this relationship as an illegal or irregular co-operation, while ignoring the fact that in reality such professional relationships take place within a routine and legal framework. The fact that the two officers had worked together in the past does not imply the planning and management of such an event and linking this connection to the murder is based on an unrealistic assumption.
Furthermore, the argument that the telephone conversations between Yılmazer and Demirkale were directly related to the organisation and management of the murder is seriously lacking in evidence. The content and context of the telephone conversations between the two intelligence officers indicate, unless the contrary is proven, that they were made for routine professional and operational purposes. To claim that these conversations are directly linked to the murder is both to misrepresent the professional status of the officers and to misinterpret the nature of such conversations.
However, when the rationale behind these allegations is taken into account, it may be argued that the recorded telephone traffic between Istanbul Gendarmerie Intelligence Commander Lieutenant Colonel Aycan Oktaylar and Istanbul Intelligence Branch Director Ahmet İlhan Güler may similarly be related to the organisation and management of the murder. However, these telephone conversations have not been considered within the scope of these allegations. This is because, unless proven otherwise, such conversations are generally accepted as routine communications between public officials with similar duties and responsibilities, which take place in the natural course of life, for the purpose of sharing information. Linking such conversations to the organisation and management of the murder is merely a speculative assumption, and such interpretations, without concrete evidence or a clear context, amount to a misunderstanding of the nature of professional duties. It would therefore be a fairer and more realistic approach to consider these conversations and similar communications as part of general professional activities and not only in the context of a specific incident.
7) Incitement and Support for the Murder
Claims of inciting the murder based on Samast’s testimony; countered by denials from other involved parties and the speculative nature of the claim.
Based on the testimony of Ogün Samast, it is alleged that Yılmazer played an inciting role prior to the murder and that he supported and encouraged the perpetrators.
Ogün Samast first mentioned the names Ramazan Akyürek and Ali Fuat Yılmazer (Fuat Manager) in his prosecution statement on 5 December 2014, 7 years after the murder.
Ogün Samast: As I wrote in the letter, Yasin first took me to Erhan TUNCEL’s house. I was playing games on the computer at the house. The kitchen area was about 3 meters behind where I was sitting, and the kitchen door was open. I overheard Erhan and Yasin talking. They were discussing ‘this job’. I turned around when I heard Erhan mention ‘Ramazan AKYÜREK and Director Fuat’. Yasin said, ‘then our back is covered’. When we left the house, I asked Yasin, ‘I know Ramazan AKYÜREK by name, I know he was a director in Trabzon, but who is Director Fuat?’ Yasin told me, ‘They are acquaintances of Erhan. We were going to have another guy do this job, but he backed out. Erhan got references from them. Even the Istanbul Police Chief knows, but they all have our back. Think about it, you’ll be a hero. It’ll be bad if you back out, I’ll burn you,’ as I said before, I just said okay again.
In his testimony for the prosecution in 2022, Erhan Tuncel explicitly denied this allegation and stated that such a conversation never took place.
Erhan Tuncel: In the court, the statement made by Ogün Samast about Ali Fuat Yılmazer and Ramazan Akyürek supporting us, which he said occurred between me and Yasin Hayal, was discussed. After this matter came up, Yasin denied it in his statement. There is no aspect of Ogün’s statement that should be given priority here. Due to the physical layout of my house, it’s impossible for Ogün to hear something spoken in the kitchen from my room. At the mentioned date, Ali Fuat Yılmazer was working as a Branch Director in Ankara, C Division. It’s impossible for him to know me. I also couldn’t possibly know him by name. As an intelligence officer, he would use a code name. Moreover, if such information exists, someone from the Police should have given it to me. Who from the Police gave me this information? The individuals I am connected with have been tried, and there is no such narrative or claim.
Yasin Hayal also denied the allegation in his statement to the prosecutor’s office in 2015.
Yasin Hayal: I don’t remember the dialogue that Ogün SAMAST mentioned as having occurred between him and me. However, Erhan TUNCEL used to say that he knew many police officers. Because of Erhan TUNCEL’s claims about knowing many police officers, I told Ogün SAMAST that we have strong support. But I don’t remember the part about Ramazan AKYÜREK and Director Fuat.
Therefore, two of the persons allegedly involved in the alleged conversation deny the allegation. Furthermore, there is no other concrete evidence to prove that the conversation in question took place as alleged.
8) Planning and Monitoring of the Murder
Allegations of plotting the murder with others; refuted by lack of concrete evidence and the speculative basis of the allegations.
It is alleged that the murder was monitored by a group involving Yılmazer and that the commission of the murder was planned together with the other defendants, Ramazan Akyürek and Muharrem Demirkale, as evidenced by the findings.
It should be noted that the allegation that the murder plot was organised by a group including Ali Fuat Yılmazer is based on the assumption that Istanbul Gendarmerie Intelligence personnel were present near Hrant Dink’s workplace on the day of the murder and that they had connections with Gendarmerie Captain Muharrem Demirkale. However, this assumption has been refuted by both the detailed call logs (HTS) and the testimonies of gendarmerie personnel. There is no concrete evidence to support the presence of Istanbul Gendarmerie Intelligence personnel at the scene on the day of the murder. In fact, there is information and testimonies that disprove this assumption. Moreover, the allegation that Demirkale and Yılmazer were involved in the incident is unfounded and lacks a factual basis beyond their professional acquaintance dating back to previous years. Without concrete evidence linking them to the plotting or the commission of the offence, this allegation is baseless and unfounded.
9) Closure of IDP Programme
Accused of shutting down the IDP programme to conceal involvement; countered by stating the temporary closure was a measure to protect investigation integrity.
It is stated that the Intelligence Evaluation Programme (IDP) was shut down after the Dink murder and that this was confirmed by the statements made by witness Ali Loğoğlu in court. Since Ali Fuat Yılmazer was in charge of the unit where the IDP programme was registered, it is claimed that this prevented the security units from becoming aware of the intelligence information available before the murder and thus prevented the responsible persons, including himself, from being exposed.
Closing the IDP query screen for a short period of time is a measure to protect the integrity of the investigation and to prevent potential suspects from escaping. This measure was taken to increase the effectiveness of the investigation and minimise the potential negative effects of media intensity. The closure of the interrogation screen has no connection with any attempt to conceal those responsible for the murder.
Furthermore, it is a vague and speculative interpretation to establish a direct causal link between the short closure of the interrogation screen and the concealment of those responsible for the murder. Nor is such a link supported by concrete evidence and a clear logical chain.
Therefore, Yılmazer’s role and actions in the Dink murder investigation, when assessed from various perspectives, show that he made serious efforts to shed light on the case. In particular, the short closure of the IDP interrogation screen is an important step in terms of the integrity and sensitivity of the investigation. Yılmazer’s action was taken in view of the intense media interest in the case, in order to prevent a possible decipherment and to protect the integrity of the investigation. This does not indicate that he is not hiding those responsible, but rather that he is taking a proactive and responsible approach towards the resolution of the case.
10) Illegal Bureau Management
Claims of managing an illegal C-5 Bureau; refuted by stating the bureau’s formation was legal and part of an official restructuring.
In June 2006, it is stated that the C-5 Bureau, which is alleged to be a secret organisation operating illegally and in violation of the legislation, was established. It is alleged that initially, only sergeants and deputy sergeants worked in this unit in a secluded environment, that police officers were prohibited from entering this room and that they were only used for errands and errands. It is alleged that the C-5 Bureau dealt with the murders of Hrant Dink, Priest Santora, Zirve Publishing House, Ergenekon, Sledgehammer and other important events, that Yılmaz Angın, with the rank of Sergeant, was in charge of the bureau, and that the infrastructure for operations such as Ergenekon and Sledgehammer was prepared in this bureau, as evidenced by the dozens of documents that were deducted to this bureau.
This allegation about the C5 Bureau is based on the biassed reports sent to the Prosecutor’s Office by Engin Dinç, who was the Trabzon Intelligence Branch Director at the time and who was later appointed as the Head of the Intelligence Department.
In fact, there is no formation of an illegal bureau as alleged. Nor is there a situation that would require a long-term and meticulous study. Because the records of the Department, the relevant legislation and the amendments made to the legislation show the truth in a very clear and simple manner.
The organisational structure of the Intelligence Department is determined by the Regulation on the Establishment, Duties and Operation of the Central and Provincial Units of the Intelligence Department dated 19 July 1995. According to the Regulation, the C Branch Directorate was composed of bureaus named C1, C2 and C3, but with the amendment made on 12 February 2007, C4, C5 and C6 bureaus were created. At the time of Dink’s murder, there was no bureau named C5, the matter was handled by the C2 bureau chief as can be understood from all official records.
In February 2015, the following statements in Dinç’s letter addressed to the prosecutor’s office are noteworthy:
“As a result of extensive, meticulously conducted investigations, we have obtained information and findings that are considered to resolve doubts related to the matter and to provide significant benefits to the course of the investigation. These are detailed below.”
The duty chart for the day of the murder also proves this.
On the other hand, it is necessary to emphasise the method of “compartmentalisation”, which refers to increasing the security of sensitive information and operations in intelligence units. Information and tasks are strictly compartmentalised and only authorised persons have access to this information. The main purpose of compartmentalisation in the intelligence field is to maximise security and secrecy. The C2 Bureau also operated in accordance with the principle of compartmentalisation. Given the sensitivity of the matters dealt with by the C2 Bureau, it is natural that it would require more secrecy measures than other units. This is due to the nature and necessity of its operations and does not mean that its activities are illegal. On the contrary, the compartmentalisation and secrecy measures applied by the C2 Bureau are fully in line with the methods and techniques of intelligence gathering and processing. Such high levels of secrecy and security measures are common and accepted practice in intelligence agencies, particularly where sensitive information is being processed. The C2 Bureau’s activities were conducted in accordance with the high standards required by the intelligence community, and these standards are vital to national security and information security. In this context, the C2 Bureau’s activities were shaped and functioned effectively within legal frameworks and in line with the requirements of the intelligence community.
11) Attempt to Replace Güler
Accusations of planning to replace Ahmet İlhan Güler; countered by highlighting the routine nature of administrative changes and lack of direct evidence linking to the murder.
It is alleged that Coşgun Çakar and Ramazan Akyürek, the managers of the İDB, planned to appoint Ali Fuat Yılmazer to replace Ahmet İlhan Güler, whom they wanted to dismiss from the Istanbul Intelligence Directorate. It is also alleged that this appointment was made as a result of biased inspection reports.
It is alleged that Ali Fuat Yılmazer, Director of Branch C of the Intelligence Department, and Ramazan Akyürek, Head of the Intelligence Department, organised and directed the murder of Hrant Dink in order to take over the Istanbul Intelligence Department. According to this allegation, Akyürek and Yılmazer claimed that Ahmet İlhan Güler, the then Director of the Istanbul Intelligence Department, prevented some police operations they planned to carry out in Istanbul and that the murder was committed in order to remove Güler from office. However, the logic and justifications underlying this allegation harbour serious question marks.
Firstly, it should be noted that in countries such as Turkey, the appointment and dismissal of public officials, especially those in critical positions, may be influenced by political views and preferences from time to time. However, to directly associate routine administrative decisions such as the appointment or dismissal of a public official with criminal acts, especially a murder, goes against the basic logic of law and the understanding of justice. This allegation is based on a far-fetched fiction in order to associate a change of office and administrative processes with a murder. Moreover, the appointment in question was a routine administrative procedure approved by Oğuz Kağan Köksal, then Director General of Security, and Abdulkadir Aksu, then Minister of Interior. It should be noted that neither Aksu nor Köksal was consulted in the context of this allegation.
Furthermore, this allegation is based on the statement made by Ahmet İlhan Güler, the Director of the Istanbul Intelligence Branch, nine years after the murder. The ‘dismissal’ mentioned in Güler’s statement took place within the scope of routine administrative procedures, during which Ali Fuat Yılmazer was appointed with the approval of the Minister of Interior.
The allegations are based on a meeting between Akyürek, one of his deputies and the personnel manager and Güler only six days before the murder, in which Güler was offered another assignment. However, this is not sufficient evidence to establish a direct link to the murder. There is no basis for concluding that the murder would not have taken place if Güler had accepted the change of assignment.
Finally, the allegations that an ‘organisation’ was formed in the Istanbul Intelligence Branch also do not correspond to the facts. While it is true that Yılmazer was appointed after Güler’s dismissal, it is a matter of record that there was no change of personnel in the Istanbul Intelligence Branch Directorate and that Yılmazer continued to work with the old staff.
12) Obstruction of Inspectors
Allegations of pressuring inspectors to prevent exposure; denied by testimonies from involved inspectors and the lack of direct evidence.
It is alleged that Yılmazer exhibited preventive behaviors out of concern that his responsibility would be revealed by pressuring Prime Ministry inspectors and obstructed the inspectors from meeting with individuals they wanted to interview.
Ayşegül Genç, the Chief Inspector of the Prime Ministry who wrote a report on the responsibilities of public officials in the Dink murder, claims that in 2004, they obtained a flash drive containing the contact information of Yasin Hayal from Volkan Altunbulak, who served in the Istanbul Intelligence Branch Directorate at the time. However, she alleges that they could not obtain Altunbulak’s statement during that period as he was reluctant to testify on this matter. During this process, it is claimed that the meeting they intended to have with Erhan Evren, who Altunbulak claimed delivered the disk to him and served in the Intelligence Branch Directorate, was obstructed by Yılmazer.
This unfounded claim raises some significant questions. Firstly, this information did not come up during the administrative investigation and was only brought up later in the court process. In case the administrative investigation yielded no results, it would be expected for inspectors to suspend or initiate proceedings against public officials attempting to obstruct the investigation by using their powers. However, no such step was taken at that time. Additionally, it is evident that the official procedures necessary for consulting a witness’s information in an investigation were not followed, and no correspondence was made on this matter. Lastly, no concrete evidence supporting this claim has been presented; neither Altunbulak’s nor Evren’s statements were consulted.
Furthermore, the claim that Yılmazer threatened and tried to put pressure on the inspectors through Akyürek has been directly denied by the Inspection Board President Muttalip Ünal and the Chief Inspector Mehmet Akın, who conducted the investigation together with Ayşegül Genç.
In his testimony to the prosecutor in 2014, Mehmet Akın, the Chief Inspector of the Prime Ministry who conducted the investigation along with Ayşegül Genç, stated the following:
Mehmet Akın: Regarding the question mentioned above, I don’t remember the exact date because it has been a very long time. We had many meetings with the president about this issue, but I can’t recall the specific date. One day, our president Muttalip ÜNAL called us, and we went to his office. As far as I remember, he told us things like ‘be careful with yourselves, your phones, your relationships’. I didn’t perceive this meeting as a threat, but rather as advice and recommendation. I don’t remember who called you there or whether the name Ramazan AKYÜREK was mentioned.
When asked and read the statement of Ayşe Gül GENÇ on this matter: I have nothing to say about this statement, but I didn’t perceive our president’s speech that day as a threat, rather as a warning. However, I can say that I didn’t take part in many investigations like the Susurluk investigation, the missing weapons investigation, the white energy investigation, but the only investigation I want to reset in my memory is the Hrant Dink investigation. It’s like everyone is on our side in everything, and I am tired of everything being written for or against us, whether said or unsaid.
Muttalip Ünal also stated the following in his testimony to the prosecutor in 2014:
Muttalip Ünal: I may have had a conversation with our colleagues Mehmet AKIN and Ayşegül GENÇ in my office about taking care of themselves, but it has been a long time and I don’t remember exactly. I definitely know it was in this context. In my meetings with Ramazan AKYÜREK, the idea that Ramazan AKYÜREK threatened our colleagues is out of the question. In these meetings, I asked Ramazan AKYÜREK to help us because it was difficult to reveal the organizational aspect of the Hrant DİNK murder through the inspection board’s work and resources, and whether there was a connection to Ergenekon or evidence in this direction. We thought that if there was an organizational connection in the DİNK murder, only the contributions of the authorities conducting the investigation could clarify it. Moreover, at that time, we had difficulties in obtaining HTS reports that include phone conversations. We officially applied to the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the Ministry of Justice, but we couldn’t get the phone record transcripts we wanted.
13) Concealment of Intelligence Information
Accused of hiding information in the F4 report; refuted by court decisions that found no evidence of the report or Yılmazer’s involvement in concealment.
It is alleged that Yılmazer was aware of intelligence information regarding who committed the murder, which is claimed to be hidden or destroyed in the F4 report. Additionally, Yılmazer is accused of concealing information that could expose them, facilitating the commission of the murder, and acting together with other responsible defendants from Trabzon Police and Istanbul Gendarmerie Intelligence during this process.
This unfounded claim has been refuted by the Istanbul Regional Court of Justice 2nd Criminal Chamber’s decision dated June 9, 2022. According to this decision, the charges against Yılmazer were withdrawn, the conviction was lifted, and Yılmazer was acquitted. The court stated the following in its decision:
“Although it is alleged that the defendants destroyed or hid the F4 report number 11, it cannot be definitively determined based on the entire case file that this document was actually prepared. According to the working procedures of intelligence units, if information is obtained in the meeting with an auxiliary intelligence officer, the F4 document is prepared. While it is stated in F3 document number 11 that the F4 document was prepared based on this document, since the F3 document was prepared before the F4 document, it has not been proven that this expression is a statement forgotten to be deleted in the previously prepared and computer-recorded template document. There is no evidence regarding the preparation of the F4 document in question, its content, who did it, or who ordered it, and thus the allegation could not be proven. The convictions of the first-degree court against the defendants for this crime were lifted, and the defendants were acquitted.”
14) Credibility of Defences
Yılmazer’s court defences were challenged for lacking credibility; countered by emphasizing the presumption of innocence and the lack of evidence against him.
It is alleged that Yılmazer’s defences in court lack credibility in the face of obtained and substantiated evidence and are perceived as an attempt to escape from the crime.
First and foremost, it is crucial to emphasise a fundamental principle of the legal system: the presumption of innocence. In our legal system, every individual is presumed innocent until proven guilty based on reasonable suspicion. This principle is the cornerstone of our justice system and prevents unjust accusations against a defendant without sufficient evidence. The defendant is not burdened with proving their innocence; on the contrary, the burden of proving that the crime was committed rests with the prosecution.
The court’s assertion that Yılmazer’s defences lack credibility reflects an opinion that contradicts the fundamental legal principles of the case. Yılmazer and his legal representatives are under the obligation to effectively defend their interests, which entails rigorously questioning the accusations and scrutinising the foundations of the case. Questioning the credibility of Yılmazer’s defences due to their nature is contrary to the fundamental structure of the judicial system. Adversarial proceedings ensure the determination of the truth through the conflict of opposing arguments.
Furthermore, it is evident that the court has ignored many pieces of evidence supporting Yılmazer’s innocence. Indeed, the court has blatantly disregarded the evidence without providing a proper justification and has overlooked all evidence presented by Yılmazer without any evaluation.
Alleging that the defences aim to escape from the crime exceeds the court’s authority and indicates a prejudiced view of Yılmazer as presumed guilty. The role of the courts is to fairly evaluate the evidence and arguments and ultimately ensure justice. Therefore, such a biassed approach contradicts the fundamental principles of the legal system. Courts should listen to all parties impartially and conduct an objective assessment instead of questioning the credibility and foundations of the defences.