Ramazan Akyürek, the then Trabzon Provincial Police Chief and Head of the Intelligence Department, was sentenced to aggravated life imprisonment for ‘Intentional Manslaughter’ in accordance with Article 82/1-a of the Turkish Penal Code and to 7 years and 6 months imprisonment for ‘Forgery of an Official Document’ by Istanbul 14th High Criminal Court in relation to the murder of Hrant Dink. On the other hand, the 2nd Criminal Chamber of the Istanbul Regional Court of Appeals first overturned the sentence of 5 years, 7 months and 15 days for the offence of ‘Distorting, Destroying or Concealing an Official Document’ and then acquitted Akyürek of this offence as a result of the trial.
The allegations against Akyürek are diverse and complex. The allegations include; approving the demotion of the intelligence officer, eliminating information sources by not foreseeing the danger, failing to fulfil the requirements of his role as a referee as the Head of the Department, preventing the flow of information to Istanbul after the murder, closing the IDP query screen on the day of the murder, concealing information and documents in order to influence the investigation, encouraging the perpetrators, There are a number of accusations, or more accurately assumptions, such as having the perpetrator followed on the day of the incident, forging documents, trying to link the murder with the Ergenekon investigation and, most importantly, organising this murder in order to take over the Istanbul Intelligence Branch Directorate in order to pave the way for the Ergenekon investigations. In this analysis, we will examine each of these allegations in detail and discuss Akyürek’s defence and the background of the allegations
In a nutshell:
Allegation: Accusations against Akyürek include approving an intelligence officer’s demotion, failing to foresee danger, not fulfilling his role effectively, hindering information flow post-murder, and being involved in document forgery and the murder organisation for personal gain.
Sentence: Ramazan Akyürek, former Trabzon Provincial Police Chief and Intelligence Department Head, received an aggravated life sentence for ‘Intentional Manslaughter’ and 7.5 years for ‘Forgery of an Official Document’ related to Hrant Dink’s murder.
The 2nd Criminal Chamber of the Istanbul Regional Court of Appeals overturned a sentence for ‘Distorting, Destroying or Concealing an Official Document’ and acquitted Akyürek of this charge.
1) Demotion Approval
Akyürek approved Erhan Tuncel’s demotion in 2006, but documents show Trabzon’s decision led to this, questioning Akyürek’s direct responsibility.
In the court decision, it was stated that Ramazan Akyürek, while serving as Trabzon Provincial Police Directorate, sent a letter dated 17 February 2006 to the Directorate General of Security (EGM) Intelligence Department informing that Hrant Dink would be killed by Yasin Hayal. Despite this, it was alleged that Akyürek, after his appointment as the Head of the EGM Intelligence Department in May 2006, approved in November 2006 the request of Erhan Tuncel, the only intelligence officer who could have provided information on the murder, to be demoted from being an AIE (auxiliary intelligence officer) by Trabzon Police Intelligence.
As it is understood from the document dated 17 November 2004 and signed by Ramazan Akyürek, who was Trabzon Provincial Police Chief at the time, Erhan Tuncel was made an auxiliary intelligence officer under the code name Mehmet Kurt in 2004. On 2 December 2004, Trabzon’s request was approved by Sabri Uzun, Head of the Intelligence Department, and Erhan Tuncel was registered as a probationary employee. In March 2006, Tuncel was moved from the probationary phase to the category of permanent intelligence officer with an official letter signed by Akyürek. Following Akyürek’s appointment as the Head of the Intelligence Department in 2006, Reşat Altay was appointed as the Provincial Police Chief of Trabzon and the following process continued under Altay’s responsibility.
As regards Tuncel’s dismissal, a report dated 16 November 2006, stating that no efficiency could be obtained from him, was written by Trabzon Intelligence Branch officers. Upon this report, an official letter dated 17 November 2006 signed by Reşat Altay, Trabzon Provincial Director of Security, stating that Tuncel had been dismissed as an employee and that he was to be removed from the records was sent to the ISB. On 23 November 2006, Trabzon Security Directorate was notified by an official letter signed by Ramazan Akyürek, Head of the Intelligence Department, that Tuncel had been removed from the records.
As it can be clearly seen from the official documents, Akyürek had no responsibility in the process of Tuncel’s dismissal other than approving Trabzon’s decision.
However, it is argued that Akyürek should have had knowledge and, more importantly, approval of the process of dismissal from the force, as he had previously served as Trabzon Provincial Police Chief. At this point, the main issue to be analysed is the extent to which Akyürek was involved in the process of disqualification and what role this decision played in the murder case. First of all, it should be noted that the decision to dismiss Tuncel was taken by the Trabzon Provincial Security Directorate. The role of the Intelligence Department was to write off Tuncel from the records of the Directorate. The approval mentioned in the allegation does not relate to the decision to dismiss Tuncel for lack of efficiency, but rather to the decision to deduct Tuncel from the records of the Directorate. On the other hand, if it is claimed that the decision to dismiss is an important argument in determining responsibility in the murder case, it is clear that the personnel of the Trabzon Provincial Directorate of Security who made the decision to dismiss would be responsible for this, not the personnel of the Intelligence Department who made a routine deduction from the records. However, it should be noted that Reşat Altay, who was the Trabzon Provincial Police Chief at the time and who signed the official letter dated 17 November 2006 containing the decision of dismissal and sent it to the Intelligence Department, was acquitted.
2) Information Source Elimination
Despite knowing the murder threat to Dink, Akyürek approved Tuncel’s demotion, but this is contested by the fact that multiple intelligence sources existed, and Istanbul was already informed.
According to the allegation, Ramazan Akyürek, despite having precise information that Hrant Dink was going to be murdered, took an action that eliminated his sources of information by approving Tuncel’s demotion. It is alleged that this action led to the commission of the murder, considering that even with simple judgement it could have been foreseen that the danger to Dink’s life would increase. Furthermore, it is alleged that he failed to fulfil his legal obligation to protect the right to life of Hrant Dink, who was in clear and imminent danger.
One of the accusations levelled against Ramazan Akyürek is the allegation that, although he knew of the danger of Hrant Dink’s murder, he approved the demotion of his employee Erhan Tuncel and thus paved the way for the murder. However, when we evaluate this allegation, we realise that a more comprehensive perspective must be taken into account.
Firstly, we need to look at a perspective in which official processes are followed. The process of Akyürek’s removal of Tuncel as a member of staff was a process initiated by the Trabzon Provincial Security Directorate and Akyürek acted only as an official part of this process. The termination of his staff status took place in accordance with official procedures and no concrete evidence was presented to show that this decision was made with the intention of committing the murder. Furthermore, the performance, or rather inefficiency, of the employee was part of this process. It should be emphasised that the determination of inefficiency was not Akyürek’s.
It is also important to note that Erhan Tuncel is not the only source. It is known to the court that Trabzon Gendarmerie Intelligence units were also following this matter. Furthermore, when the alleged dates are analysed, information was conveyed to the Istanbul security authorities prior to the murder of Hrant Dink. In other words, the security units in Istanbul had already been informed about the possible danger of the murder. Therefore, the argument that Akyürek tried to prevent the murder by conveying this information to Istanbul on time is quite strong.
Moreover, it is illogical for Akyürek to approve the dismissal of a news officer who was a source of information and to try to carry out the murder. If Akyürek had wanted the murder to take place, he would not have sent information to Istanbul in February 2006. Both trying to prevent the murder by transmitting information and at the same time losing the source of information does not follow a coherent logic. Therefore, this accusation against Akyürek cannot go beyond a speculative assumption.
3) Failure as a ‘Referee’
Akyürek is criticized for not coordinating between Trabzon and Istanbul effectively, but the role of ‘referee’ is not officially defined in his duties.
According to the allegation, in a situation involving more than one province, such as the fact that the group to commit the murder was located in Trabzon and the target lived in Istanbul, the Intelligence Department should have fulfilled its duty as ‘referee’, ensuring that an operation was carried out in Trabzon to apprehend the group that had planned the act, and providing Istanbul with the necessary information to protect the target. However, it is alleged that this two-way obligation was not fulfilled.
It would be wrong to address such an allegation without taking into account the multi-dimensional and complex nature of intelligence services. The legislation determining Akyürek’s duties and responsibilities as the Head of the Department is the 1995 Regulation on the Establishment, Duties and Work of the Central and Provincial Units of the Intelligence Department. Nowhere in the Regulation is the role of ‘referee’ defined for the Head of the Department. However, the Vice Presidents in charge of the Intelligence Branches are charged with the duty and responsibility of ‘ensuring coordination between the units reporting to him and the provincial units’ (Article 26-b). Any assessment to be made without taking into account the duties and responsibilities of the Deputy Heads reporting to the Head of the Department, the Intelligence Branch Directors reporting to them and the Provincial Intelligence Branch Directorates would be incorrect. Allegations that ignore the way intelligence services are carried out and the logic of collective work, and that place all responsibility solely on the Head of the Department do not correspond to reality. It should also be borne in mind that none of the Deputy Heads of the Department were held responsible during the trial.
On the other hand, this allegation seems to underline the obligation for the Trabzon Intelligence Branch to contact the judicial police for the purpose of ‘apprehension’ and for the Istanbul Intelligence Branch to inform the Provincial Protection Commission for the ‘protection of the target’. In terms of both legislation and practice, neither the Trabzon Intelligence Branch needs to wait for the Head of Department to instruct the judicial police nor the Istanbul Intelligence Branch to activate the Provincial Protection Commission, or for the Head of Department to act as an ‘arbiter’ and direct the matter. Trabzon could have referred the matter to the judicial police in the light of the information it had obtained and ensured that the perpetrators were apprehended. However, not only did they not do this, but Engin Dinç, who was the Trabzon Intelligence Branch Director at the time and who failed to fulfil this responsibility, was among those acquitted in the case. Similarly, upon the letter from Trabzon and based on their previous knowledge of Dink, the Istanbul Intelligence Branch could have activated the Provincial Protection Commission and ensured Dink’s protection. However, although the Istanbul Police officers also failed to fulfil this responsibility, Ahmet İlhan Güler, the then Director of the Istanbul Intelligence Branch, was among those acquitted.
As a reflection of this fact, for example, 11 days after the murder, Ahmet İlhan Güler, the Director of the Istanbul Intelligence Branch, shared information about Mehmet Ağar with the Istanbul Provincial Protection Branch Directorate in an official letter without waiting for the approval of the Head of the Department or the use of the ‘referee’ role.
4) Post-Murder Actions
Allegations suggest Akyürek withheld information post-murder, but evidence indicates Istanbul was already informed, challenging the claim of information withholding.
It was alleged that Akyürek contacted Erhan Tuncel through Muhittin Zenit after the murder was committed and confirmed the information about the murder. It was also alleged that Celalettin Cerrah, who came to the Istanbul Security Directorate on the same day and asked the officers allegedly working to solve the murder and himself as the former Trabzon Police Chief if he had any information, said “I don’t know anything” and left Istanbul.
Firstly, it should be noted that the Head of the Intelligence Department does not have any responsibility towards any Provincial Police Chief. Neither according to the legislation nor in practice, there is no method for the Provincial Security Chiefs to be informed by the Head of the Intelligence Department. Therefore, Cerrah’s allegation that Akyürek withheld information from him is fundamentally flawed. Neither Cerrah personally requested information from Akyürek nor Akyürek had the responsibility to inform Cerrah. According to Article 44 of the Intelligence Regulation, Provincial Intelligence Branch Directors are responsible to the Provincial Police Chiefs for the execution of the service. According to this article, the duty of presenting the intelligence information in Istanbul to the Provincial Security Director belongs to Ahmet İlhan Güler, the Director of Intelligence.
Furthermore, the allegation that Akyürek withheld information from Istanbul does not reflect the truth and appears to be a serious distortion. Trabzon’s letter of February 2006 reached Istanbul and Istanbul was informed about the matter. In May 2006, Akyürek, who was appointed as the Head of the Intelligence Department, did not have any more information about the subsequent developments in Trabzon than what Istanbul knew. Before the conversation in question took place, Akyürek had already spoken to Istanbul Intelligence officials and there was already a mutual exchange of information. Therefore, Akyürek’s statement “I don’t know” is literally true, based on the fact that he does not have more information than what Istanbul has or what was shared before the meeting. The allegation that he withheld information is not true. On the contrary, he instructed all intelligence personnel to work rapidly to clarify the matter and to share the information needed in this context.
5) Closing IDP Query Screen
The IDP query screen closure on the murder day is defended as a measure to protect investigation integrity, not to conceal information.
It is alleged that on the day of the murder, Akyürek was instructed to close the Hrant Dink query page in the IDP Programme of the Intelligence Department, which contained the information that an action would be taken by Yasin Hayal against Hrant Dink.
The short-term closure of the IDP query screen is a measure to protect the integrity of the investigation and to prevent potential suspects from escaping. This measure was taken to increase the effectiveness of the investigation and to minimise the possible negative effects of media intensity. The closure of the interrogation screen has no connection with any attempt to conceal those responsible for the murder.
Furthermore, to draw a direct causal link between the brief switching off of the interrogation screen and the concealment of those responsible for the murder is a vague and speculative interpretation. Nor is such a link supported by concrete evidence and a clear logical chain.
Therefore, Akyürek’s role in the Dink murder investigation and the actions he has taken, when evaluated from various perspectives, show that he has been making serious efforts towards the elucidation of this incident. In particular, the closing of the IDP interrogation screen for a short period of time is an important step in terms of the integrity and sensitivity of the investigation. This action of Akyürek, taking into account the intense interest of the media, was taken in order to prevent a possible decipherment and to protect the integrity of the investigation. This does not indicate that he is hiding those responsible, but rather that he is taking a proactive and responsible approach towards the resolution of the case.
6) Forgery of Official Documents
Claims of Akyürek sharing false information about technical investigations on Yasin Hayal’s phone are countered by inconsistent findings and expert reports, questioning the forgery accusation.
It was alleged that Akyürek, during the administrative investigation, despite the expert report to the contrary, shared information with an official letter stating that the Istanbul Intelligence Branch Directorate had not conducted a technical investigation on Yasin Hayal’s phone number before the murder and thus committed the offence of forging official documents.
It is of critical importance for the case to determine whether the Istanbul Intelligence Department actually carried out a technical study following Trabzon’s official letter in February 2006. While the Istanbul Intelligence officials claim that a study was carried out, the officials of the Intelligence Department claim that if a study was carried out, the log records should confirm this, but that there is no log record showing that a study was carried out. The Court, without any concrete justification, accepted the claim of Istanbul as true and the claim of the Department as false, and made a judgement by accepting the assumption that the log records had been deleted as fact. However, the facts show otherwise.
The findings of the preliminary investigation report of the Interior Inspectors dated 11 March 2010 refuted Istanbul’s allegations but were ignored by the court. The findings of the inspectors should be analysed in detail, as they are critical to the course of the case:
- Bülent Köksal, the deputy director of the intelligence branch, and Volkan Altunbulak, a sergeant, stated that the letter dated February 2006 was an important letter, an important note was written on the letter, and accordingly it was determined that the letter from Trabzon was not a raw or routine letter.
- Upon the examination of the “Dell” brand computer of Volkan Altunbulak, an Istanbul intelligence branch officer, by an expert committee consisting of professors from Istanbul University, it was concluded that the file Yasin Hayal enson.xls had been opened on 17 February 2006 and that the file had remained open for 8 minutes. Based on this expert report, Akif İkbal, the Mülkiye inspector, concluded that the Istanbul Intelligence Department had taken the necessary actions upon the letter from Trabzon and that they were not at fault.
- It was decided by the inspectors to have the relevant computer subjected to expert examination by a new committee specialised in the field, and in the report received from the experts, it was determined that it was among the possibilities that the file created in the computer could have been created on another computer whose time and date were changed and moved to Volkan Altunbulak’s computer. For this reason, it is not clear that the relevant file was opened on the specified date.
- According to the report dated 16 June 2009 of the expert committee examining the log records of the EGM intelligence department, no work was carried out in the IDP/IDEA systems by Volkan Altunbulak or Istanbul intelligence branch officers based on the names “Hrant Dink”, “Yasin Hayal” and “Osman Hayal”. Furthermore, when the DARA (telephone detail recording system) project was analysed, it was found that there were no log records indicating that the phones 05387190381 and 05382044104 were interrogated by Volkan Altunbulak or any other Istanbul intelligence branch officer in 2006-2007. It is understood that Volkan Altunbulak did not conduct any query or research in the IDP/IDEA/DARA systems or projects on 20 February 2006, contrary to his claims. It is also stated that the log records of the IDP/IDEA/DARA projects within the Intelligence Department have not been deleted or altered.
- The Istanbul Intelligence Branch made investigations on suspicions that the investigation report prepared by police officers Bahadır Tekin and Özcan Özkan based on the information stated in the letter from Trabzon was not dated 24 February 2006, as it was written on the report, but was prepared after the murder in order to avoid responsibility. a) Although the report was initialed in hierarchical order, it was observed that an intermediate level supervisor, Superintendent İbrahim Şevki Eldivan, did not initial this report without any official excuse. It is among the possibilities that the reason for this is that the report was prepared on the date of the murder and İbrahim Şevki Eldivan was on duty abroad at that time. b) It has been determined that 65 of the 66 investigation reports prepared by police officer Bahadır Tekin between 1 November 2005 and 31 December 2006 were saved in the archive programme named VADI used in the Istanbul intelligence branch, only the report dated 24 February 2006, which is the subject of the incident, was not saved. c) Although 65 of the 66 investigation reports prepared by Bahadır Tekin were not initialed, it is observed that only the report dated 24 February 2006 was initialed by the line supervisors. d) During the signing of the relevant report by the superiors from the police officer to the branch manager, it was found that İbrahim Pala, the intermediate police chief, wrote a note on the report as an order to conduct an investigation, and then the report was presented to Ahmet ilhan Güler, the branch manager, and it is not usual to write such a statement on a report presented to a superior. e) It has been determined that between 1 November 2005 and 31 December 2006, Bahadır Tekin, Özcan Özkan and Kahraman Küllücek worked together as a team in most investigations, but the report dated 24 February 2006, which is the subject of the incident, does not bear the signature of Kahraman Küllücek. In the statements taken, the reasons why Kahraman Küllücek did not participate in this investigation were not concretely revealed. Even if these reasons alone are not sufficient to form an opinion, taken together they strengthen the suspicion that the report was prepared after the murder.
- The possibility that on 24 February 2006, police officers Bahadır Tekin and Özcan Özkan may have carried out a search on the address in Ümraniye where Osman Hayal may have worked, as alleged, after the murder has been examined. Accordingly, it was determined that the police officers concerned were on another surveillance mission in the Fatih/Istanbul area from 09:30 in the morning until 01:00 at night on 24 February 2006. The Istanbul intelligence officers whose statements were taken stated that the investigation on the Ümraniye side was carried out before 9:30 a.m. and that they then moved to the Fatih area. It is understood that it is very unlikely that police officers, whose residence addresses are on the European side of Istanbul, would have travelled to Ümraniye in the early morning in Istanbul traffic, conducted an investigation and returned to the Fatih area before 09:30.
- The date when Volkan Altunbulak said that he ordered the investigation and the date when Bahadır Tekin, who is alleged to have conducted the investigation, said that he received the order are contradictory.
- The date on which Volkan Altunbulak said that he had telephoned Özkan Mumcu, who was in charge of Trabzon intelligence, and informed him about the matter contradicts the date stated by Özkan Mumcu.
- Accordingly, it is understood that the available information, documents, statements and expert reports confirm the allegation that both the intelligence interrogations and studies that commissar Volkan Altunbulak said he had carried out on 20 February 2006 and the investigation work carried out by police officers Bahadır Tekin and Özcan Özkan in Ümraniye on 24 February 2006 were not carried out and that the investigation report dated 24 February 2006 was not prepared on the said date but on another date.
- It has been determined that the Istanbul intelligence branch did not carry out the work allegedly carried out upon the letter from Trabzon.
- With regard to the refusal to offer protection, Article 11 of the Regulation on Protection Services stipulates that the duty imposed on intelligence units is conditional upon the person to be protected being in life-threatening danger. The letter from Trabzon clearly shows that Hrant Dink is in life-threatening danger. In this case, the Istanbul intelligence branch should have referred the matter to the provincial protection commission. It has been determined that it failed to fulfil its duty by not doing so.
These findings were not refuted during the trial and decisions of non-prosecution or acquittal were made against Istanbul Intelligence personnel by ignoring these findings. Therefore, the allegation of forged documents against Akyürek does not reflect the truth.
7) Concealment of Responsibilities
Accusations of Akyürek concealing public officials’ responsibilities in the murder are based on unverified claims and were refuted in court.
It was alleged that Akyürek, acting together with the Chief Inspector of Civil Administration Sükrü Yıldız, did not provide the information and documents requested by the expert Levent Yarımel in the letter dated 16/02/2008 in order to conceal the responsibilities of some public officials in the C-2 branch (bureau) of the Intelligence Department and Trabzon Intelligence Branch Directorate. In addition, it was alleged that Yarımel did not provide the F/3 and F/4 reports and log records regarding the meetings held with the IE, which were requested for the solution of the murder, by saying “this letter will burn us, what are you doing?”.
Akyürek stated in all his defences that he had never made such a statement and that there had never been any situation that would require him to make such a statement. This untruthful situation, which does not go beyond Yarımel’s one-sided claim, was accepted as true by the court and taken as a basis for the judgement. It also contradicts with the rules of logic to expect the Head of the Department to provide Yarımel with log records that do not exist. The F3 and F4 reports were sent to the relevant person in all official requests made within the scope of all judicial and administrative investigations.
On the other hand, according to the testimony of Chief Civil Inspector Şükrü Yıldız before the court, the accusations against him proved to be invalid. Furthermore, as a result of the investigation carried out by Chief Civil Investigator Şükrü Yıldız, it has been revealed that the Istanbul Intelligence Department and other relevant authorities were negligent in relation to the murder of Hrant Dink and that the responsibility for these negligence lies with the Istanbul Police. The experts Durmuş Demirbaş and Levent Yarımel ignored the negligence of the Istanbul Intelligence Department and tried to shift the responsibility to other areas and individuals.
While the court should have conducted an investigation to find the material truth among the conflicting reports, it acted with prejudice in order to find Akyürek guilty and committed a serious violation of rights by preferring false statements to proven facts.
8) Support to Perpetrators
Allegations of Akyürek’s support to the murder instigators are denied by key figures and lack concrete evidence.
In relation to the murder, it was alleged that Akyürek supported and encouraged the instigators and perpetrators prior to the murder according to the statements of the perpetrator Ogün SAMAST.
Ogün Samast first mentioned the names Ramazan Akyürek and Ali Fuat Yılmazer (Fuat Manager) in his statement to the prosecutor’s office on 5 December 2014, 7 years after the murder.
Erhan Tuncel clearly denied this allegation in his prosecution statement in 2022 and stated that such a conversation never took place.
Yasin Hayal also denied the allegation in his prosecution statement in 2015.
Therefore, two of the three persons with whom the alleged conversation took place deny the allegation. Furthermore, there is no other concrete evidence to prove that the meeting in question took place in the manner stated in the allegation. The fact that the allegation was made 7 years after the murder was also assessed against Akyürek by the court. The fact that the murderer Ogün Samast would have said this in his first statement in order to protect himself was ignored.
9) Surveillance of Perpetrator
Claims against Akyürek and others following the murder process lack evidence and have been refuted by call records and statements.
At the time of the murder, Istanbul Provincial Gendarmerie officer Muharrem Demirkale and his entourage were alleged to have been closely following the perpetrator, and Akyürek was alleged to have followed the entire process under the leadership of Ali Fuat Yılmazer and Muharrem Demirkale.
It should be noted that this allegation is based on the assumption that Istanbul Gendarmerie Intelligence personnel were present near Hrant Dink’s workplace on the day of the incident and that they had connections with Gendarmerie Captain Muharrem Demirkale. However, this assumption has been refuted by both the call detail records (HTS) and the statements of gendarmerie personnel. There is no concrete evidence to support the presence of Istanbul Gendarmerie Intelligence personnel at the scene on the day of the murder. In fact, there is information and testimonies that refute this assumption. Moreover, the allegation that Akyürek, Demirkale and Yılmazer were involved in the crime is baseless and without any factual basis. Without concrete evidence linking them to the planning or execution of the offence, this allegation is baseless and unfounded.
10) Concealment of Reports
Allegations of hiding key reports related to the murder were dismissed by the 2nd Criminal Chamber of the Istanbul Regional Court of Appeals, leading to acquittal.
In the investigations conducted after the murder, it was alleged that Akyürek concealed the F/3 meeting report numbered 11 and the F/4 news report prepared within this report from all investigation authorities.
This untrue allegation was refuted by the decision of the 2nd Criminal Chamber of the Istanbul Regional Court of Appeals dated 9 June 2022. According to this decision, the charge against Akyürek was withdrawn, the conviction was annulled and Yılmazer was acquitted. In its judgement, the court stated:
“Although it is alleged that the defendants destroyed or concealed the F4 report numbered 11, according to the entire scope of the file, it could not be conclusively determined that this document was issued. According to the working procedures of intelligence units, an F3 document is issued as a result of an interview with an auxiliary intelligence officer, and an F4 document is issued if information is obtained in this interview. In the F3 document numbered 11, it is stated that the F4 document was issued based on this document, but the defence that this phrase was a phrase in the template document that was previously issued and saved in the computer and forgotten to be deleted because the F3 document was issued before the F4 document could not be proven otherwise. Since there is no evidence that the F4 document subject to the allegation was issued, what its content was, and if it was destroyed or concealed, by whom it was made or made to be made, the imputed allegation could not be proven, and the convictions of the court of first instance against the defendants in terms of this offence were annulled and the defendants were acquitted.”
11) Directive to Withhold Information
Claims of Akyürek instructing not to disclose perpetrator information to Istanbul are denied and considered illogical since Istanbul already knew about Tuncel.
It was alleged that Akyürek instructed Faruk Sarı, Director of Trabzon Intelligence Branch, not to disclose the perpetrators of the murder and the role of Erhan Tuncel to the officers of Istanbul Security Directorate in order to keep the responsibility for the murder in Istanbul Security Directorate.
This allegation attributed to Faruk Sarı by Ahmet İlhan Güler is a completely untrue fiction. In his defence in court, Faruk Sarı states that he never made such a statement in his conversations with Güler. Sarı’s statement is as follows:
“In the indictment, Trabzon Intelligence Branch Director Faruk Sarı, who was telephoned by Istanbul Intelligence Branch Director Ahmet İlhan Güler after Erhan Tuncel told the Istanbul Security Directorate, where he was captured in Trabzon and brought, that he was an auxiliary intelligence officer of Trabzon Intelligence Branch Directorate, told Ahmet İlhan Güler, who asked him why he did not give this information, that Ramazan Akyürek and Ali Fuat Yılmazer should not give information to Istanbul, “There are statements and accusations in the indictment that ‘he replied that they said that this would be left to Istanbul anyway‘, I do not accept this, I do not accept this, I have never had such a conversation with Ahmet İlhan that Ramazan Akyürek or Ali Fuat Yılmazer said that this would be left to Istanbul, such a thing is out of the question, because it is not appropriate to say or think such a thing when we already have Erhan Tuncel’s records, the records of the officer, the F3, F4 reports, technical surveillance activities, all of these.”
Moreover, since it was already known by Istanbul that Erhan Tuncel was an intelligence officer, this fictional allegation is incompatible with the rules of logic.
12) Murder Organisation for Positional Gain
Allegations of organizing the murder to secure a position in the Istanbul Intelligence Branch are based on speculative connections and routine administrative decisions.
In order to ensure the appointment of Ali Fuat Yılmazer to the Istanbul Intelligence Branch Directorate, which was considered to be the centre of Ergenekon Operations, Ahmet İlhan Güler, the then Director of the Istanbul Intelligence Branch, who was seen as an obstacle to the operations, was summoned to the Intelligence Department six days before the murder and asked to leave his post. It was also alleged that Ahmet İlhan Güler complained about this situation to Coşgun Çakar, Head of the Personnel Branch of the Intelligence Department, and was told by Akyürek: “Whatever his friends say is what happens”.
It is alleged that Ramazan Akyürek, Head of the Intelligence Department, and Ali Fuat Yılmazer, Head of Branch C of the Intelligence Department, organised and directed the murder of Hrant Dink in order to take over the Istanbul Intelligence Department. According to this allegation, Akyürek and Yılmazer claimed that Ahmet İlhan Güler, then Director of the Istanbul Intelligence Department, prevented some police operations they planned to carry out in Istanbul and that the murder was committed in order to remove Güler from office. However, the logic and justifications underlying this allegation harbour serious question marks.
Firstly, it should be noted that in countries such as Turkey, the appointment and dismissal of public officials, especially those in critical positions, may be influenced by political views and preferences from time to time. However, to directly associate routine administrative decisions such as the appointment or dismissal of a public official with criminal acts, especially a murder, goes against the basic logic of law and the understanding of justice. This allegation is based on a far-fetched fiction in order to link a change of office and administrative processes with a murder. Moreover, the appointment in question was a routine administrative procedure approved by Oğuz Kağan Köksal, then Director General of Security, and Abdulkadir Aksu, then Minister of Interior. It should be noted that neither Aksu nor Köksal was consulted in the context of this allegation.
Furthermore, this allegation is based on the statement made by Ahmet İlhan Güler, the Director of the Istanbul Intelligence Branch, nine years after the murder. The ‘dismissal’ mentioned in Güler’s statement took place within the framework of routine administrative procedures and Ali Fuat Yılmazer was appointed with the approval of the Minister of Interior.
The allegations are based on a meeting between Akyürek, an aide and the personnel manager and Güler only six days before the murder, in which Güler was offered another assignment. However, this is not sufficient evidence to establish a direct link to the murder. There is no basis to conclude that the murder would not have been committed if Güler had accepted the change of assignment.
Furthermore, the use of the phrase ‘whatever the friends say’ is a baseless allegation that has no factual basis and has been denied by Akyürek and Coşkun Çakar themselves. In his statement given to the prosecutor’s office in 2015, Çakar stated the following:
Finally, the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer investigations are judicial processes carried out in Istanbul, in which Akyürek had nothing to do. The Ergenekon investigation was initiated by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office and continued after 2009, when Akyürek left the Intelligence Department. The Sledgehammer investigation is also a judicial process carried out in Istanbul after Akyürek left office.
13) Linking Murder to Ergenekon Investigations
Claims of Akyürek attempting to associate the murder with Ergenekon investigations are not supported by evidence and are based on unverified diagrams.
It is alleged that during Akyürek’s presidency, officers of the Intelligence Department presented a diagram to the Public Prosecutors conducting the investigation, showing that the murder of Hrant Dink was attempted to be linked to the Ergenekon investigations.
Akyürek only transmitted the information and documents within the Department in accordance with the instructions of the Prosecutor’s Office and in official letters. However, the diagram mentioned in the allegation is not included in these information transmissions. A scheme, which is not clear who prepared it and where and how it was used, has been attributed to Akyürek despite having nothing to do with it, and this has been accepted as fact and included in the judgement. However, in the testimony of Hakan Aydın Türkeli, who was in charge of the Istanbul Police Department at the time, it is stated that the diagram in question was shown to him and Selim Kutkan, the then Istanbul Terrorism Director Selim Kutkan, by Selim Berna Altay, the prosecutor conducting the Dink investigation. Türkeli states as follows:
“…again Selim Berna Altay Prosecutor, we were only together, Mr Selim and the Anti-Terror Branch Director, he brought a diagram. The diagram was a diagram that we already knew before, showing the telephone traffic of such nationalist groups, showing their contacts with each other, and this diagram was a very distant point, because we took a lot of people from the Hrant Dink circle, because we took a lot of people from that circle, one of them had a very weak contact with this thing.”
14) Pre-Murder Knowledge
Allegations of Akyürek’s awareness and planning of the murder from 2005 are based on unclear evidence and questionable reliability.
It has been alleged that Hrant Dink was going to be murdered and that preparations for this started on 13 October 2005, during the period when Akyürek was in office as Trabzon Provincial Police Chief, and therefore, although the process of the murder was known, the murder was carried out within the framework of an alleged plan by Akyürek and his associates.
The concrete evidence on which the accusations are based is unclear and the reliability of these allegations is questionable. The use of this fiction, which is based almost entirely on contradictory and inconsistent statements, as a justification for the offence of manslaughter by design is the clearest indication of the lack of a fair trial.
15) Credibility of Defences
Akyürek’s defences in court are challenged for lacking credibility, but this overlooks the presumption of innocence and the requirement for the prosecution to prove guilt.
It was claimed that Akyürek’s defences before the court were aimed at avoiding the charge as they had no credibility in the face of the evidence obtained.
Firstly, it is necessary to emphasise the fundamental principle of the legal system: the presumption of innocence. In our legal system, every individual is presumed innocent until found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. This principle is the cornerstone of our justice system and prevents a defendant from being falsely accused without sufficient evidence. The accused is not under the burden of proving his or her innocence, but rather the prosecution has the burden of proving that the offence has been committed.
The Court’s assertion that Akyürek’s defences lacked credibility reflects a view that is incompatible with the basic legal principles of the case. Yilmazer and his legal representatives are under an obligation to defend their interests effectively and the defence amounts to a serious questioning of the charges and the basis of the case. To question the credibility of Akyürek’s defences because of their nature is contrary to the fundamental nature of the judicial system. This is because adversarial proceedings ensure that justice is found through the confrontation of opposing arguments to establish the facts.
Moreover, it is evident that the court ignored much evidence of Akyürek’s innocence. Indeed, it is clear that the court ignored the evidence without proper justification and disregarded all the evidence presented by Akyürek without any assessment.
To claim that the defences were intended to avoid guilt exceeds the limits of the court’s jurisdiction and shows a prejudicial acceptance of Akyürek as guilty. Such a prejudicial approach is contrary to the fundamental principles of the legal system, as the task of the courts is to fairly assess the evidence and arguments and ultimately deliver justice. Instead of questioning the credibility and merits of the defences, courts should hear all parties fairly and make an objective assessment.