Finalized Sentences
The sentences of Ramazan Akyürek and Ali Fuat Yılmazer on the charge of TPC 82/1-a “premeditated intentional killing” were upheld.
The sentences of Metin Balta, Yakup Kurtaran and Ercan Gün on the charge of TPC 314 “membership of an armed terrorist organization” were upheld.
Overturned against
Osman Gülbel, Muharrem Demirkale, Hasan Durmusoglu, Faruk Sarı, Mehmet Ayhan, Onur Karakaya, Ali Öz, Okan Şimsek, Gazi Günay and Veysal Şahin should be sentenced as joint perpetrators for the crime TPC 82/1-a “premeditated intentional killing” and should be sentenced more severely.
Yavuz Karakaya and Bekir Yokuş should be sentenced as accomplices to the crime of “premeditated intentional killing” under TPC 82/1-a and should be sentenced more severely.
It was stated that Bekir Yokuş, Okan Şimşek, Gazi Günay, Veysal Şahin, Mehmet Ayhan, Onur Karakaya, Ali Öz should be sentenced on the charge of TPC 309 “attempting to overthrow the constitutional order” and the acquittals given in their favor were overturned.
Overturned in favor
Volkan Şahin‘s sentence on the charge TPC 83 “intentional killing with negligent behavior” was overturned, and it was ruled that a decision of acquittal should be given.
Şükrü Yıldız‘s sentence on the charge TPC 314/2 “aiding an armed terrorist organization” was overturned and it was ruled that a decision of acquittal should be given.
Mehmet Ali Özkılınç‘s sentence on the charge TPC 314 “membership of an armed terrorist organization” was overturned and it was ruled that a decision of acquittal should be given.
How does the Court of Cassation assess the case?
According to the entire scope of the file, the obtained information and findings, statements, correspondence and reports, Yasin Hayal, one of the instigators of the act of murder, and Erhan Tuncel, who was later found to be the other instigator, were taken under surveillance by the Trabzon province Police Intelligence units as a result of the investigation into the handmade bomb attack that took place in 2004 at the MC Donald’s in Trabzon,
The information about Yasin Hayal, who was the perpetrator of the bombing at that time, was obtained from the other person, Erhan Tuncel, who was a university student in Trabzon, was assigned as an auxiliary intelligence officer in Trabzon Provincial Police Intelligence Branch under the code name Mehmet Kurt, and in this context, he had meetings with the Police Intelligence officers until he was dismissed from this duty in November 2006,
information about the murder was obtained from him, some of these interviews were included in the report, while others were deliberately omitted,
The statement that ‘it was deliberately not reported‘ shows an intention to pave the way for Dink’s murder to be committed. This statement does not reflect the truth.
The information received from Erhan Tuncel was recorded in news reports called F4. This report was prepared in case the information received from informants was significant. Erhan Tuncel provided the information in F4 reports no. 9 and 10 on the murder of Hrant Dink. After the F4 report no. 10 dated 8 April 2006, Muhittin Zenit, a police officer in Trabzon intelligence branch who dealt with Erhan Tuncel, informed Engin Dinç, the branch chief, that Tuncel was unreliable and that his informant status should be terminated. A meeting between Dinç and Tuncel took place in May 2006 and the decision was taken to keep Tuncel as an informant. For six months following this meeting, the police officers who interviewed Tuncel did not file any news reports. At the end of the 6th month, Erhan Tuncel’s informant status was terminated on the grounds that he was unreliable, demanded too much money and did not show up for meetings.
While there was no obligation to prepare a news report in the meetings with the informant and it was known by the police officers in the Trabzon intelligence branch that Tuncel was unreliable, it does not seem reasonable to seek an underlying motive for the murder in the fact that the information provided by Tuncel was not turned into a report. Moreover, the fact that no charges were brought against Ercan Demir, the Superintendent at the Intelligence Branch, who met with Tuncel many times during this period, demonstrates that the Court has an objective to selectively punish some of the police officers.
that this contact was not terminated even after the dismissal from the auxiliary intelligence staff,
Erhan Tuncel’s dismissal from the informant status was approved on 23 November 2006, but this was not communicated to Tuncel. HTS records show that before the murder, on December 12, 2006, 19 days after he was removed as an informant, the last conversation between Tuncel and the intelligence police took place.
Therefore, there was no communication for the purpose of receiving intelligence from Tuncel after the termination of his informant status.
Nevertheless, the Court accepts that the communication continued until the last moment, and that the absence of HTS records, especially between 12 December and 19 January, the day of the murder, was deliberately kept secret without being recorded. According to the Court’s logic, if there is an HTS record, it is accepted as evidence that they met, if there is no HTS, they met, but they did not appear in the HTS records to hide it. Therefore, the Court does not interpret the events and evidence objectively, but arbitrarily in the way it prefers.
In addition, wiretapping and physical surveillance continued until the act of murder, and the communications of both perpetrators were monitored and detected by the Trabzon Provincial Police Intelligence Branch before and after the murder (between 2004 and 2007),
With this statement, the Court assumes that Erhan Tuncel and Yasin Hayal were monitored until the last moment and that the murder was allowed to take place under the supervision of the police. This approach both contradicts the Court’s other arguments and is a misinterpretation of the facts.
The Court said that by dismissing Erhan Tuncel as an informant, Yasin Hayal and the murder he had planned could no longer be monitored so it sentenced those who implemented the decision to dismiss him. Here, on the other hand, by saying that Yasin Hayal and Erhan Tuncel were being wiretapped and monitored until the last moment, the Court acknowledged that the murder was committed under the supervision of the Police and charged the same people again. This shows only one of the contradictions in the Court’s decision.
Ogün Samast, who committed the murder, was not known to the Police. (The name Samast is not mentioned in any official document. The assumption that the police knew the name Samast is based on the unverified one-sided statements of Erhan Tuncel). For this reason, while Yasin Hayal and Erhan Tuncel, who were under surveillance, continued their lives in Trabzon, the police officers did not encounter any suspicious situation. Both Yasin Hayal and Erhan Tuncel stated that they were careful with their conversations because they were aware that their phones were tapped. It was even found out that Yasin Hayal was in contact with Ogün Samast through his friend Ahmet İskender. Therefore, there was no data obtained from Hayal and Tuncel’s phone calls and their surveillance in Trabzon in relation to the Dink murder. The Court misinterprets the fact that there was no data on the murder from 23 November 2006 to 19 January 2007, the day of the murder, with a speculative approach that there was data but it was hidden.
According to the information obtained from the auxiliary intelligence officer Erhan Tuncel, in February 2006, it was reported that Yasin Hayal would “kill journalist Fırat (Hrant) Dink at all costs due to his writings and statements against Turkishness”; however, this critical intelligence was disguised and the Istanbul Provincial Police was informed with some warnings that Yasin Hayal would carry out an action against Armenians in Istanbul,
The court accepts that the act of killing cannot be inferred from the communication sent to the Istanbul police and that this was done deliberately.
First of all, it is very clear that the communication sent to Istanbul can be understood to mean killing. Only the Istanbul police personnel and the Court argue otherwise. In the communication, it was written that Yasin Hayal was going to carry out a sound-making action against Hrant Dink and that Hayal was a person with extreme ideas who did whatever he set his mind to and who had previously planted a bomb in McDonald’s, injuring 6 people. Such a description clearly shows that the action to be taken was an action against Dink’s life.
Furthermore, the person who signed this communication was Engin Dinç, the chief of the Trabzon intelligence branch. If there was a deliberate disguise, Dinç, who wrote the communication, should be responsible for it. However, the Court acquitted Engin Dinç, saying that he had no responsibility. The court used Dinç’s acts as a justification for sentencing the other defendants.
In June 2006, after the known shooter changed his mind, Yasin Hayal, who was under the surveillance of Trabzon Provincial Police Intelligence Branch, searched for a new shooter to carry out the attack until August 2006,
First of all, in the information received from Erhan Tuncel and reflected in the reports, it was written that Yasin Hayal himself would carry out the action.
Erhan Tuncel said that Hayal had found a shooter named Zeynel Abidin Yavuz in a meeting with Engin Dinç, the chief of the Trabzon Intelligence Branch. This news was not officially recorded. It was found out that Yavuz went to another province to avoid carrying out this action.
However, no document or evidence was found to show that any information about Hayal’s search for a new shooter reached the police officers. (The only statements to this effect are the unverifiable statements of Erhan Tuncel.) No document on the subject was sent to the Department of Intelligence, which is accused of planning and organizing the murder.
Moreover, Engin Dinç was the chief of the Trabzon Intelligence branch during this period. The Court again acted inconsistently and did not charge Dinç in this regard.
In August 2006, the fact that the perpetrator Ogün Samast was identified as the shooter was provided as information by the officers of Trabzon Provincial Police Intelligence Branch during the meetings with the auxiliary intelligence officer Erhan Tuncel in September and October 2006, but the meetings related to these dates and afterwards were not recorded in a news report,
An F3 meeting report was issued for two meetings with Erhan Tuncel in September and October. However, police officers who did not receive any significant information from Tuncel did not issue an F4 news report.
Erhan Tuncel is the person who claims to have informed the police that Ogün Samast was the new shooter. Police officers, on the other hand, stated that they did not receive such information from Tuncel.
Therefore, there is no concrete evidence to show that the police officers knew the name Ogün Samast. The only evidence provided by the Court in this regard is Erhan Tuncel’s statements.
In the face of the first instance court’s reliance on the unilateral statements of both Ogün Samast and Erhan Tuncel, which were not verified elsewhere, the Court of Cassation did not examine the nature of the evidence and issued a copy-and-paste decision with the same statements.
In November 2006, it was decided to terminate the duty of the auxiliary intelligence officer,
Click here for the discussion on who did this.
in the prevention of the murder, which was known to be committed as of this date, the aim was to take over the management of certain places and units, and to obtain other and “later understood to be organizational” interests through the murder regarding the internal duty areas, such as the release of certain places from responsibility,
This statement of the Court of Cassation is a completely baseless speculation and is the insertion of the AKP government’s political discourse into the judgment.
- First of all, what is meant by the acquisition of certain positions is the transfer of Ahmet İlhan Güler from the Istanbul intelligence branch and the appointment of a different person in his place. Click here for the statement that there is no connection between the act of murder and Güler’s replacement.
- The concealment of the responsibilities of certain authorities refers to the Trabzon police and the Department of Intelligence.
- In the investigation into the allegation that reports containing information received from informants in the Trabzon police department were destroyed, the Court of Appeal, in its ruling in 2022, acquitted the defendants on the grounds that there was no evidence that the documents were both issued and destroyed.
- Since there was no evidence of log records allegedly deleted to conceal the responsibility of the Department of Intelligence, the Court did not consider this as a basis for the verdict. At the same time, the allegation that the Department of Intelligence was attempting to exonerate the Department of Intelligence through the reports of the Civil Administration inspectors was also unfounded as the inspectors were acquitted of the charges against them. Therefore, the allegation of trying to conceal responsibility also has no basis.
- What is meant by the phrase “later understood to be organizational” is the discrediting of the Turkish Armed Forces and the creation of a basis for Ergenekon operations, as stated in the first instance court’s decision. The inclusion of this speculative and subjective evaluation in the decision of the Court of Cassation, which is expected to evaluate evidence in a criminal case on a legal basis, is an indication that the Court of Cassation is acting in line with the political interests of the AKP government. To answer anyway:
- After Dink’s murder, it was the Istanbul and Trabzon police officers and the governor of Trabzon whose responsibility was brought to the spotlight, who were considered to be negligent in the incident and whose positions were replaced. Therefore, it was not only gendarmerie personnel who came to the fore in this incident. The discrediting of the Turkish Armed Forces is a baseless assumption.
- Ergenekon operations began six months after Dink’s murder, following a tip-off. The issue of minorities was included in the Kafes action plan, not Ergenekon. These investigations were not led by Ramazan Akyürek and Ali Fuat Yılmazer, the alleged organizers of the Dink murder. Therefore, there is no connection between the murder of Dink and the launch of the Ergenekon operations.
actions were taken to conceal records and documents likely to lead to liability,
With the allegations that the documents were concealed, it is pointed out that the reports and documents were destroyed in Trabzon Police Department. However, this information is not true.
On 2 February 2006, a Dell server was found to have malfunctioned in the Trabzon Police Intelligence Branch. However, it was revealed that this device was sent to the Department for examination exactly one year after the murder and that there were no documents on it. The first instance court did not take this issue as a basis for the verdict due to the lack of evidence.
It was claimed that F4 report no. 11 and all F5 reports were destroyed at Trabzon Police Department. The first instance court sentenced Ramazan Akyürek, Ali Fuat Yılmazer and some Trabzon Police officers on this ground. However, in 2002, the Court of Appeal overturned these sentences and acquitted the defendants, rejecting the allegation that the reports, the issuance of which was not even certain, had been destroyed.
The Court of Appeal also overturned the charge of forgery of official documents against Ramazan Akyürek on the grounds that his letter to the civil inspectors investigating the Istanbul Police Department did not reflect the truth, and acquitted Akyürek. In conclusion, no concealment of documents supported by concrete evidence has been established.
the support given to the perpetrators of the murder in this plan, which is detailed below, as a result of which the murder took place,
There is no support given to the perpetrators of the murder.
The allegation that Akyürek and Yılmazer supported the perpetrators belongs to the shooter Ogün Samast, who testified to prosecutor Gökalp Kökçü in 2015. Samast claimed that he overheard a conversation between Yasin Hayal and Erhan Tuncel, in which Ramazan and Fuat chiefs were behind us. However, both Erhan Tuncel and Yasin Hayal denied this conversation. Therefore, both the court of first instance and the Court of Cassation took into account the killer’s statements 9 years after the incident, which were not verified elsewhere, and which were in line with the political discourse of the government, and used them as justification in sentencing the defendants.
The sentences imposed on the grounds that Ogün Samast was followed and supported by the gendarmerie on the day of the murder are mere speculation based on HTS records without concrete evidence. As a matter of fact, while the Court stated that the gendarmerie who transmitted a phone signal close to the crime scene was there for the murder, the Court stated that the other two gendarmerie officers whose phones did not transmit a signal at the time of the murder turned off their phones so that it would not be understood that they were at the scene of the murder. This inconsistent approach to the interpretation of the events shows that the court’s intention was to complete the fabricated story in the indictment by sentencing some public officials in particular.
Moreover, Akyürek has no relationship or meeting with Erhan Tuncel, nor with Hayal and Samast. If support is to be mentioned, Engin Dinç, the chief of the Trabzon Intelligence Branch, who met with Erhan Tuncel in his office and to whom Tuncel sent a letter after the incident saying “you be a big brother and I will be a brother to you” should be investigated. Let us note that the Court acquitted Engin Dinç of all charges.
The secret organizational goal of the plot investigations initiated in the institutions seized after the murder with the dismissals from office was also achieved,
First of all, what is meant by the acquisition of certain positions is the removal of Ahmet İlhan Güler from his position as chief of Istanbul’s intelligence branch and the appointment of a replacement. Click here for the statement that there is no connection between the act of murder and Güler’s replacement.
The allegation that the murder of Hrant Dink was carried out by the Gülen community is included in the indictment of prosecutor Gökalp Kökçü, who acts in line with the political interests of the AKP government. This allegation was included in the court decision by judge Akın Gürlek, who was rewarded with the deputy ministry of justice as a fruit of his unlawful activities in favor of the government. In 2023, it was upheld by members of the Court of Cassation, who clearly stated that they would not implement the decision of the Constitutional Court, causing a legal crisis.
The Hrant Dink murder case was used for the political interests of the AKP government and billed to the Gülen community. Therefore, the verdict is a story based on baseless allegations without concrete evidence and is unacceptable.
In the same period, before the murder and in July 2006, Trabzon Provincial Gendarmerie Intelligence officers were aware of the murder plot because Coşkun İğci, the brother-in-law of the instigator Yasin Hayal, informed the Gendarmerie Intelligence officers that “Hrant Dink was going to be killed by Yasin Hayal and that he was trying to procure weapons for this action”, They, in turn, reported this information to their immediate superiors, but this matter was first put on hold by the highest supervisor and no record action was taken, and instead of sharing this intelligence as the officials and officers in charge of Police Intelligence did, the officials and officers in charge of Trabzon Provincial Gendarmerie Intelligence also followed the planning process,
This negligence on the part of the Trabzon Gendarmerie was demonstrated by the statements of the defendants and witnesses.
However, here the court claims that the Trabzon Gendarmerie was also involved in the coordination of the Gülen Community. However, the court of first instance acquitted both the regiment commander Ali Öz and the other gendarmerie officers involved in the exploratory activity, finding that they were not members of the Gulen Community. Click here for the court’s inconsistent and meaningless assessment of the organization.
In August 2006, Trabzon Provincial Gendarmerie Intelligence officers carried out exploratory activities at the residence of the deceased by contacting Istanbul Provincial Gendarmerie Intelligence unit,
The exploration allegation is one of the court’s most far-fetched interpretations.
Did the Trabzon gendarmerie really go to Istanbul to find the perpetrator of a murder?
Following a murder in Trabzon, gendarmerie officers began searching for the perpetrator. The perpetrator was identified as a person named Coşkun Aydın. The gendarmerie searching for Coşkun Aydın reached a person named Halit Sağlam. This person said that the murderer could stay at an address in Istanbul. Upon this, 3 gendarmerie officers went to Istanbul on assignment to find the killer.
The court asked Trabzon gendarmerie to show the assignment letter. The letter could not be found in the archive. However, a letter written by Regiment Commander Ali Öz, stating that Gazi Günay, Okan Şimşek and Ergün Yorulmaz left for Istanbul on 8 August 2006 for the purpose of arresting Coşkun Aydın and returned from Istanbul on 12 August 2006 and demanding payment of their travel allowances was found in the Finance Office.
All gendarmerie officers and, moreover, a person named Halit Sağlam confirmed that they had traveled to Istanbul to arrest the murderer.
But the Court was not convinced. Without even consulting an expert, the Court commented on the functioning of the law enforcement agencies and said, “Although there are statements that the gendarmerie went to Istanbul to arrest Coşkun AYDIN, who is wanted as a suspect in the murder of two people in June 2006, Halit Sağlam, who is alleged to have given information that the suspect was in the house of a relative in Istanbul, is also the accomplice of the suspect and the person who was also prosecuted for the same incident. It is not possible for the defendants, who are equipped with intelligence capabilities, to be assigned out of the province without any action or work to confirm the information they are alleged to have received, according to the procedures for assignment out of the province. In order to make an assignment and obtain the consent of the Governor’s Office, the evidence must be solid.” “The officers’ purpose in going to Istanbul was exploration” the court said.
What was the purpose of the contact with Istanbul gendarmerie officers?
HTS records show that before the Trabzon gendarmerie officers arrived in Istanbul, they contacted an officer working in the intelligence unit of the Istanbul gendarmerie. At the same time, two days before their arrival, they contacted Muharrem Demirkale, the commander of the relevant unit, once. After arriving in Istanbul, they again requested accommodation, vehicles and personnel from the relevant gendarmerie commander.
Meanwhile, they met with Halit Sağlam in Bakırköy. The phone calls made by the officers in this area were seen in the HTS records. The court claimed that this area was close to Beyaz Adam Publishing, owned by Hrant Dink, and that the officers had in fact conducted exploration there. The only basis for this baseless claim is that the HTS records show that the officers were in Bakırköy
a) The purpose of being in Bakırköy was to meet Halit Sağlam and it was Sağlam himself who proposed to meet there.
b) Muharrem Demirkale and Şeref Ateş, who welcomed the people who came for exploration and are alleged to be in the organization of the murder, did not accompany and guide the Trabzon gendarmerie, who did not know Istanbul, in the exploration activity. If the exploration is being carried out in an organized manner, why don’t the people who know better lead it?
c) If an exploration was conducted, who delivered the results of this exploration to Ogün Samast, Yasin Hayal and Erhan Tuncel? The court did not establish any contact between the perpetrators and Trabzon gendarmerie officers who exchanged information. If the perpetrators were not informed about the exploration, this exploration would have been a meaningless activity. If the information about the exploration was transferred to the police through Muharrem Demirkale, what is the Trabzon gendarmerie doing in Istanbul? The Istanbul gendarmerie could have made the exploration itself.
Without going into the details of the incident and without making a logical evaluation, the Court just dismissed the incident by labeling it as a exploration activity with the only data it found. The Court of Cassation also made a copy-and-paste decision without making any legal evaluation.
Trabzon Provincial Gendarmerie Intelligence officers were involved in the process of the murder with the news report they prepared among themselves after the murder, which could not be seized anywhere up to that point and which even included information about the weapon used in the incident,
the defendants, who are also Istanbul Provincial Gendarmerie officers and whose responsibility is accepted, followed Ogün Samast at the murder scene before and after the murder, followed the perpetrator in a way to support the perpetrator’s decision to commit the crime and acted towards the realization of the murder,
First of all, the fact that Ogün Samast was followed on the day of the murder came to the fore with Samast’s testimony to Prosecutor Gökalp Kökçü in 2015. Nine years after the murder, Samast claimed that there were people following him and gave their descriptions. A report was requested from Forensic Institute to determine whether the people seen in the CCTV footage of the crime scene were soldiers assigned to the Istanbul gendarmerie. As a result of this report, none of the people in the footage matched the gendarmerie personnel. The characteristics and color of none of the official vehicles used by the Istanbul gendarmerie matched the vehicle described by Ogün Samast. As a result, no information was found to corroborate Samast’s statements.
Nevertheless, the Court requested the HTS records of all soldiers working in the intelligence unit of the Istanbul gendarmerie. It tried to make an inference based on these records.
The court’s fiction is as follows:
Muharrem Demirkale was found on the day of the murder in the Balmumcu area of Beşiktaş, close to the scene of the murder. Demirkale lived in military housing in this area. On the day of the incident, Demirkale’s driver, soldier Abdullah Dinç, was assigned to work between 12:00 and 15:00. Although Dinç stated in his statement taken at the police station immediately after the coup attempt that he did not go on this mission, he said in his defense in Court that he had gone to drop Demirkale off in the Balmumcu area. The court disregarded Dinç’s defense and claimed that Muharrem Demirkale was closely monitoring and directing the murder by saying that he had a phone signal close to where the murder took place, even though there was no mission.
Yavuz Karakaya and Bekir Yokuş’s phones did not signal at the time of the murder and after the murder they went to their duty location in Beykoz on the Anatolian side of Istanbul.
Events: Karakaya and Yokuş were assigned to the Beykoz region between 10:30 and 18:00 on the day of the murder. According to HTS records, Karakaya’s phone signaled at 13:52 from the Topkapı region and at 15:40 from the Beykoz region. Bekir Yokuş’s phone signaled from Topkapı at 11:48 and from Beykoz at 17:38.
As it is understood from the records, gendarmerie officers went to Beykoz sometime between 13:52 and 15:40.
Yokuş did not make any phone calls between 11:48 and 17:38.
Karakaya did not make any phone calls between 13:52 and 15:40.
Karakaya had a 25-second phone conversation with Muharrem Demirkale at 15:40.
The Court’s claim: The phone did not signal at the time of the murder because they turned off their phones so that it would not be understood that they were following the murder. They followed the murder and went to their duty stations after the murder took place. After the murder, they called Muharrem Demirkale and informed him.
There is no camera footage, witness statement, official letter, HTS record or any other evidence showing that the officers were at the murder scene. It is an assumption of the Court that the officers were at the murder scene.
The fact that the phones did not signal does not mean that the phone was switched off, but that no call was made. In his testimony, Bekir Yokuş said that he did not make many phone calls during the day and that this could be seen when the records of other days were examined. Karakaya, on the other hand, stated that the time he did not make any calls was less than two hours, which was quite natural. According to the court, not making a phone call for less than 2 hours during the day was considered as a situation contrary to the ordinary course of life.
The post could have been occupied before the murder. Karakaya’s phone signaled at 13:52 in the Topkapı area. At 15:40 in the Beykoz area. These two places are about 30 minutes away by car. Therefore, the officers could have already arrived in Beykoz around 15:05 when the murder took place. There is no evidence that the officers were at the murder scene during this time period.
At 15:40, Karakaya spoke to Muharrem Demirkale for 25 seconds, then to his superior officer Serkan Özel for 46 seconds and then to other gendarmerie officers at various times. The Court does not attribute a special meaning to the calls with Serkan Özel and other officers, but only to the call with Muharrem Demirkale, which the Court attributes an organizational meaning.
None of the gendarmerie officers who had phone signals close to the murder scene and in the area of Dink’s house in Bakırköy were punished and their connection to the murder and the alleged monitoring activity was not established.
Why was the Istanbul Gendarmerie involved in the murder of Hrant Dink?
Istanbul gendarmerie officers were involved in the Dink murder after the July 15 coup attempt. Of the 18 gendarmerie officers who were sentenced in the indictment, only Muharrem Demirkale, Yavuz Karakaya and Bekir Yokuş were sentenced for the murder. It is understood that Muharrem Demirkale and Yavuz Karakaya were included in this case due to their alleged involvement in the July 15 coup attempt and Bekir Yokuş was included only because he was on duty next to Karakaya on the day of Dink’s murder in order to strengthen the claim that the murder was carried out by the Gülen movement.
As a result, despite the absence of any evidence of surveillance, three members of the Istanbul gendarmerie were sentenced on the basis of a fiction full of contradictions based on HTS records.
after the incident, the only camera footage of Ogün Samast’s whereabouts before and after the act, the moment of the murder and the escape route were taken; comprehensive camera footage of the crime scene was not taken in order to avoid responsibility and to create the perception that the murder was carried out solely by the civilian perpetrators of the incident,
The law enforcement officers conducting an investigation at the crime scene are the Istanbul Police. If the footage was deleted or if the relevant footage was not taken, the Istanbul Police are responsible for this. However, the Court did not sentence anyone from the Istanbul Police and did not hold them responsible for the murder.
also in Ogün Samast’s statements…
A verdict based on statements made by the shooter Ogün Samast to prosecutor Gökalp Kökçü 9 years after the murder, which were not verified elsewhere, and the Court of Cassation, the highest level of the legal system, issuing a copy-and-paste verdict without examining it…
In this respect, in addition to the Gendarmerie and Police Intelligence officers, officers of the Department of Intelligence of the General Directorate of Security also had information about the murder,
It was revealed through the statements of the accused and witnesses that the Trabzon Gendarmerie was aware of the murder and that the intelligence was suppressed with the instruction given by Ali Öz.
A letter dated 17 February 2006 was sent to the Department of Intelligence, informing it that Yasin Hayal would carry out an action against Hrant Dink. The next information was the F4 report no. 10 dated 8 April 2006, which stated that Yasin Hayal was being dissuaded from carrying out the action. Since then, no information or documents related to Dink’s murder have been submitted to the Department. The only evidence presented by the Court for the Department of Intelligence’s knowledge is the F4 report no. 11, which is said to have been issued, the information sent to the department and then destroyed. The Court of Appeal confirmed that this report was never issued. Therefore, the Court’s conclusion proved to be null and void.
The argument of the Court of Cassation, which disregarded this decision, was the belief that the murder was the work of the Gülen Community, that Akyürek and others in the Trabzon Police were also connected to the Gülen Community, and that it was therefore inconceivable that the Department of Intelligence was not aware of the activities in Trabzon. Where there was no evidence, the Court made accusations based on baseless assumptions. The police officers who met with the informant Erhan Tuncel from August 2006, when the new shooter was found in Trabzon Police Department and the preparations for the murder began, have not been found to be affiliated with the Gülen Community. Therefore, this assumption of the court has also failed.
that they followed Yasin Hayal’s criminal organization before and after the murder
It was the Trabzon Police Department that followed Yasin Hayal. The last information on the subject was received by the Department of Intelligence on 8 April 2006, 9 months before the murder.
and the moment of the murder is waited for
With this statement, the Court of Cassation says that the perpetrators were followed until the last moment and that the murder could have been prevented but was not.
The Trabzon Police had been following Yasin Hayal and Erhan Tuncel, but it was Ogün Samast who committed the murder. The court found no documents or statements from officials confirming that the police knew about the shooter. Nevertheless, the Court made an assumption based on Erhan Tuncel’s unverified testimony. Therefore, there is no evidence that the Trabzon Police could have prevented the murder or was aware of the murder until the last moment.
The last information about Yasin Hayal came to the Department of Intelligence 9 months before the murder. Therefore, there is no evidence that the Intelligence Department could have prevented the murder or was aware of the incident until the last moment.
Not a single piece of information or document has been produced to show that the Istanbul Gendarmerie had information that Hrant Dink would be murdered. Click here for the statement that the assumption that Samast was being followed on the day of the murder is baseless.
It was determined that Trabzon Gendarmerie received the information that Hrant Dink would be murdered from Coşkun İğci in July 2006. After this date, there was no evidence that any action was taken in this regard. The Court did not investigate whether the Trabzon Gendarmerie could have prevented the murder but did not.
coordinated concealment and destruction of information and documents leading up to the murder,
This statement does not reflect the truth.
It was determined by the Court of Appeal that the F4 news report no. 11, which was allegedly concealed, was never issued.
The sentence given to Akyürek for allegedly concealing information and documents from the inspectors was overturned by the Court of Appeal and Akyürek was acquitted.
The decision of the court of first instance, which said that the inspectors tried to incriminate the Istanbul police by not using some documents and thus committed the crimes of aiding the Community and favoring the guilty, was overturned and the acquittal of the inspectors was requested by the Court of Cassation itself.
Having received the intelligence of the murder, Trabzon police, with a communication dated 17 February 2006, forwarded the issue to Istanbul police to take necessary action and to the Department of Intelligence for information purposes.
As a result, there is no information and documents concealed by the Trabzon police and the Department of Intelligence. The court makes an unfounded assumption without presenting any concrete evidence to this effect. The only institution that withheld information and covered up intelligence in the process leading up to the murder was the Trabzon Gendarmerie. The officials in this institution were also not found to have any connection with the Gülen movement.
they made a exploratory activities at the residence and workplace of the deceased before the incident,
The inconsistency of the exploration allegation has been explained above.
that they were watching the perpetrator at the crime scene on the day of the murder,
It has been explained above that the allegation of surveillance of the perpetrator does not reflect the truth.
it would not be inaccurate to say that this organizational crime was a terrorist act of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organization, which was determined within the scope of the file and carried out within the framework of the division of labor by the Trabzon Provincial Police and Trabzon and Istanbul Provincial Gendarmerie Intelligence officers, members of the organization who infiltrated into the state through the method of deception
Click here for an explanation of how inaccurate it is to say that the murder was committed by the Gülen movement.
and that the succession of actions and activities related to the murder cannot be explained by coincidence,
For every incident for which there is no evidence, the court arbitrarily interprets it with vague phrases such as “cannot be explained by coincidence”, “contrary to the ordinary course of life”, “cannot be explained in any other way” to complete the story in the indictment, which is full of unrealistic and baseless assumptions.
Here are some examples:
The court could not explain the claim that Ercan Gün was given the footage, but made assumptions.
It could not explain that Ali Fuat Yilmazer had seen F4 report number 9, which had no signature on it, but only made assumptions.
The court interpreted the fact that the phone signals of the Trabzon Gendarmerie assigned to Istanbul to find the murderer of the murder committed in Trabzon signaled from Bakırköy as exploratory activity, and the contact established with the officers of the Istanbul Gendarmerie intelligence unit for accommodation, vehicles and personnel as an organizational movement towards exploratory activity, without evaluating the details and logical context of the incident.
While the Court interpreted the HTS records showing that Erhan Tuncel called Trabzon Intelligence Branch before the end of his informant status as active communication with the informant, the Court interpreted the period without HTS records as communication through other channels in order not to make it obvious that communication was made.
When the court presented the fact that the phone signal of a member of the Istanbul Gendarmerie, who was said to have been following Ogün Samast, was located close to the murder scene as evidence of surveillance activity, the court assumed that the phone of the personnel who did not receive a call for a few hours were switched off so that it would not be obvious that they were at the murder scene. (The fact that the phone does not give a base signal does not mean that it was switched off, it means that no calls were made).
The court assumed that the document sent to the Department of Intelligence for Erhan Tuncel to be removed from the records after the decision to dismiss him as an informant was taken by the Trabzon Police Department must have been seen by Ali Fuat Yılmazer, even though his signature or initials were not on it.
The court assumed that the Department of Intelligence was aware of the murder until the last moment, despite the fact that the last time the Department received information about the murder of Hrant Dink was on 8 April 2006 and there was no other evidence that the Department received information after that date.
the coming together of two separate intelligence units and the defendants, who are public officials and involved in two separate intelligence units, supported the decision of the criminal organization founded by Yasin Hayal to commit the crime of the murder of Fırat (Hrant) Dink within the framework of organizational functioning and division of labor
The Trabzon Police received intelligence on the murder of Hrant Dink from Erhan Tuncel. This intelligence was shared only with the Istanbul Police and the Department of Intelligence. No connection between the Trabzon Police and the Trabzon Gendarmerie was established by the court.
The Trabzon Gendarmerie was informed of the action against Dink by a relative of Yasin Hayal in July 2006. Necessary actions were not taken on this intelligence.
The claim that the Istanbul Gendarmerie acted together with the Trabzon Gendarmerie and carried out exploratory activities does not reflect the truth.
The allegation that Ogün Samast was followed by Muharrem Demirkale on the day of the incident also does not reflect the truth.
As a result, the assumption that the intelligence units acted together and carried out the organization of the murder is a false assessment and far from reality.
The acquaintance between Ali Fuat Yılmazer and Muharrem Demirkale stems from the fact that these two officers worked together in Şanlıurfa between 2002 and 2005. Attributing a special and organizational meaning to this acquaintance, the court interprets the recorded telephone traffic between Engin Dinç, Chief of the Trabzon Police Intelligence Branch, and Metin Yıldız, Chief of the Gendarmerie Intelligence Branch, and between Colonel Aycan Oktaylar, Commander of the Istanbul Gendarmerie Intelligence Command, and Ahmet İlhan Güler, Chief of the Istanbul Police Intelligence Branch, as a professional contact.
and by directing the process leading to the commission of the murder through planning, albeit loosely, it was determined that they ensured that the result was realized.
It was Yasin Hayal who planned the murder, found the shooter and sent him to Istanbul. It was not shown by the Court that there was any instruction or direction given to Hayal by public officials on when, by whom, with which weapon and how the murder was to be carried out. The court also did not identify any official who provided information or liaison between Hayal and the Trabzon gendarmerie personnel who were alleged to have carried out the exploration. The allegation that Samast was being watched on the day of the murder (at least by the gendarmerie officers sentenced in the case) also does not reflect the truth. The only basis for the claim that the perpetrators were assisted is the statement made by Ogün Samast to Prosecutor Gökalp Kökçü 9 years after the incident, which was denied by Tuncel and Hayal. Therefore, the claim that the public officials sentenced by the court planned which stage of the murder of Hrant Dink and how they directed the perpetrators is an abstract claim that is not shown in the verdict.
The phrase “planned, albeit loosely” shows that the Court of Cassation itself did not believe it, but used it anyway in order to substantiate the accusation of an organization. Had there been even the slightest planning or support, precise statements would have been made in reference to this. As a matter of fact, nowhere else in the verdict was an evaluation made with the vague phrase ” albeit loosely”.
Moreover, Akyürek, who is alleged to have planned the entire organization on behalf of the organization, reported the intelligence he received while still in Trabzon to both the Istanbul police and the Department of Intelligence. If he had wanted the murder to be committed, he could have covered it up like Trabzon gendarmerie commander Ali Öz. If it is said that the idea of not preventing the murder from being carried out began in September 2006, this claim would also be baseless. Because in the five months prior to this date and until the murder, no information was passed to the Department of Intelligence, which he headed, meaning that he was unaware of the latest developments.
In conclusion, there was neither planning and direction nor support for the perpetrators.
When the news in national and international media outlets after the murder, thousands of people taking to the streets chanting slogans such as “We are all Armenians”, and the difficulties faced by the political power in the international arena are evaluated together, it is seen that the aim of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organization with the murder of Fırat (Hrant) Dink was to prevent the actual implementation of the order envisaged by the Constitution by spreading discourses such as the marginalization of minorities, distrust in the government, and the inability to ensure the security of life and property,
These statements have no legal basis. They are political statements of the AKP government and show the political views of the biased members of the Court of Cassation assigned by the government.
There is no connection between:
- the fact that thousands of people exercised their constitutional right to “peaceful assembly and demonstration” and marched to commemorate the death of a journalist they loved, the fact that AKP government was put in a difficult situation internationally after the murder
- and the actual implementation of the order envisaged by the constitution.
The fact that the murder was carried out by the Gülen community is an unproven assumption. If the Court of Cassation does not explain in its decision what benefit the Gülen community derived from the circumstances targeted by this murder, this claim will also remain an abstract and baseless guess. Why does the Gülen community want minorities to be marginalized and what is the basis of the allegation? In 2007, what interest could the Gülen movement have in the AKP government being in difficulty? (On the one hand, it is said that Dink’s murder was used to prepare for Ergenekon operations, while on the other hand, an inconsistent claim is made that the AKP government, known for its support for Ergenekon operations, is trying to make the AKP government in difficulty). What are the evidences showing that the discourse on the lack of security of life and property is being spread? What is the benefit of the Community from this? As long as the answers to these questions are not shown in the judgment, the judgment of the Court of Cassation will be nothing more than a political newspaper article, not a legal text.
The photographs of the perpetrator Ogün Samast taken with Samsun Provincial Gendarmerie officers in front of the Turkish flag, which were served to the press after this grave act of murder, were used to create evidence for the Balyoz and Ergenekon trials in order to place members of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organization, which infiltrated into the Turkish Armed Forces, in the management cadres,
The claim that the footage taken in Samsun was given to Ercan Gün by Ali Fuat Yılmazer does not reflect the truth.
Investigations carried out by the inspectors revealed that the photographs published in the newspapers were taken by the gendarmerie camera, while the images broadcast on Fox TV were taken by the police camera. In that case, it must be said that the Samsun gendarmerie acted to damage the image of the Turkish Armed Forces to which it is affiliated. However, no one from the Samsun gendarmerie was found to be connected to the community or to have acted on the instructions of the community.
While the court assumed that the images leaked from the police were deliberately delivered to Ercan Gün and that there was an organizational purpose, it inconsistently evaluated the images leaked from the gendarmerie as coincidental.
Furthermore, there is no connection between the murder of Hrant Dink and the start of the Ergenekon operations. The claim that Dink’s murder was attempted to be linked to the Ergenekon cases is based on a diagram allegedly given to Prosecutor Selim Berna Altay. The court was unable to determine who prepared such a diagram. No one clearly stated this in the statements of the defendants and no evidence was presented. Nevertheless, the scheme was attributed to Akyürek despite having nothing to do with it, and this was accepted as fact and included in the verdict. Apart from this, no evidence was presented to show a link between the start of the Ergenekon operations and the murder of Dink.
Again, by claiming that the Istanbul Provincial Police Department was negligent in the murder and trying to create evidence in this direction, it was ensured that members of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organization were appointed to the management positions,
It was the Interior Ministry’s civil administration inspectors who said that the Istanbul police was negligent in Dink’s murder and demanded an investigation. The court of first instance sentenced these inspectors on the grounds that they were members of the Gülen community and had committed the crime of favoring the guilty. However, the Court of Cassation overturned the sentences, stating that the inspectors did not commit the alleged crimes. Therefore, the reports written by inspectors who were not members of the Gülen movement, did not help the Gülen movement and did not favor criminals cannot be attributed to the Gülen movement.
The second evidence for attributing responsibility to the Istanbul Police Department is the statement in Akyürek’s letter to the inspectors that “it has been determined from the log records that the Istanbul Police Department did not carry out any work as a result of the communication dated February 17, 2006”. The court sentenced Akyürek for forgery of official documents, claiming that the Istanbul Police had carried out a study. However, in 2022, this sentence was overturned by the Court of Appeal and turned into an acquittal. It was revealed that Akyürek used the expressions in the document not to accuse Istanbul, but to convey the findings in the expert documents to the inspectors as they were.
The third piece of evidence for the claim that the responsibility was left to the Istanbul police is the testimony of Ahmet ilhan Güler, the chief of the Istanbul intelligence branch. Güler claimed that Faruk Sarı, the director of Trabzon’s intelligence branch, had said to him on the phone: ” Mr. Ramazan said not to give any information to Istanbul, and that the murder will be their responsibility.” However, Faruk Sarı said that the conversation did not happen like this. Despite that, the Court used Güler’s claim, which was not verified elsewhere, as a justification for its verdict.
Interestingly, when Engin Dinç claimed that he called Ahmet ilhan Güler and informed him about the murder intelligence, Güler denied this conversation and the Court said there was no evidence that the conversation took place. Here, the conversation that Güler said took place was denied by Faruk Sarı, but the Court ruled that the conversation did take place. This is an indication of the court’s arbitrary and inconsistent interpretation of events in order to punish certain public officials.
Click here for the statement that there is no connection between the act of murder and Güler’s appointment.
In this way, through the Selam Tevhid investigation that started in 2009, the MIT plot in 2012, the 17-25 December investigations in 2013, it was understood that operations were carried out to overthrow the legitimate government by creating evidence that did not reflect the truth, such as the Prime Minister, Ministers, the Head of MIT and many high-ranking public officials at the top level of the State were wiretapped and monitored, and that the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organization, which could not achieve any results from these, finally attempted a coup attempt against the constitutional order on 15 July 2016.
Click here for an explanation of how inaccurate it is to say that the murder was carried out by the Gülen movement.
This paragraph is the signature of the judges and prosecutors who serve the interests of the AKP government in the cases against the Gülen movement. They will add the Hrant Dink case to the verdict text of the next case and continue to play it as a scenario in theater courts.
Inconsistencies of the Court of Cassation
1
Which organization?
"In the concrete case, both Gendarmerie Intelligence officers and Police Intelligence officers were involved in the incident together and at the same time, they acted within the scope of organizational activities and for organizational purposes, and that such large-scale organizational actions cannot be carried out without a plan, design and randomly...
The Court of Cassation accepted that Gazi Günay, Okan Şimşek and Ergun Yorulmaz from the Trabzon Gendarmerie, with instructions from Provincial Gendarmerie Commander Ali Öz, conducted a exploration at Hrant Dink’s home and workplace in Istanbul in August 2006. The court stated that Gendarmerie Captain Muharrem Demirkale from Istanbul also took part in this exploration activity. Question: If the murder is an act organized by the Gülen Community, is the Trabzon Gendarmerie commander who ordered the exploration and the officers who carried out the exploration also part of this organization? No, Ali Öz, Okan Şimşek, Ergun Yorulmaz and Gazi Günay were not found to have any relation with the Gülen Community. They were not sentenced for being a member of the organization, the Court of Cassation did not demand such a sentence.T
Trabzon Police officers Mehmet Ayhan, Mehmet Uçar and Onur Karakaya, who requested that Erhan Tuncel be dismissed as an informant, who allegedly destroyed the F4 report dated 12 September 2006, and who are believed to have failed to record the information received from Tuncel, were also not found to be affiliated with the Gülen Community. They were not asked to be sentenced for membership or aiding the organization.
Yavuz Karakaya and Bekir Yokuş of the Istanbul Gendarmerie, who were alleged to have been following the perpetrator on the day of the murder, were also not found to be affiliated with the Gülen Movement. These officers were also not sentenced for membership in the organization.
The Court of Cassation overturned the sentences of Şükrü Yıldız, who was sentenced for aiding a terrorist organization for allegedly trying to incriminate the Istanbul Police Department with biased reports, and Mehmet Ali Özkılınç, who was sentenced for allegedly being a member of a terrorist organization, and stated that they should be acquitted. It was determined that they had no relationship with the Gülen Movement and that their reports were not false.
On the one hand, the Court of Cassation said that the murder was an organizational activity of the Gülen Community; on the other hand, it ruled that the officials who were thought to have caused the murder and prevented the investigation of the case afterwards were not related to the Gülen Community.
So which organization committed the murder and who is it composed of?
2
What happened to the inspector reports?
"For the defendant Şükrü Yıldız, he knowingly and willingly aided the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organization in the reports he prepared as a civil administration inspector after the murder of Fırat (Hrant) Dink;
For the defendant Mehmet Ali Özkılınç, he is a member of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organization due to the fact that he prepared a report as a civil administration inspector after the murder of Fırat (Hrant) Dink and ...;
As of the scope of the file, it was decided to convict them in writing as a result of a mistake in the appreciation and evaluation of the evidence instead of acquitting them of the imputed crimes, without taking into account that no clear and convincing evidence could be obtained, free from all kinds of doubts, requiring their conviction..."
Between 2007 and 2008, Şükrü Yıldız and Mehmet Ali Özkılınç prepared a series of inspector reports examining the responsibility of public officials. These reports, which sought to shed light on the before and after events, were disregarded in the Hrant Dink murder trial that began in December 2015 on the grounds that they were biased and directed by the Gülen movement. Moreover, Şükrü Yıldız, who prepared the reports, was sentenced for knowingly aiding a terrorist organization, while Mehmet Ali Özkılınç was sentenced for favoring the guilty and being a member of a terrorist organization.
The Court of Appeal overturned Mehmet Ali Özkılınç’s conviction for favoring the guilty and acquitted him. The Court of Cassation also stated that Şükrü Yıldız did not help the terrorist organization. It stated that Özkılınç was not a member of a terrorist organization. The inspectors were acquitted of all charges against them.
It was accepted that the inspectors were not members of the Gülen community, did not help the Gülen community and did not favor criminals, and that they had therefore prepared a fair report. Nevertheless, these reports were not used to shed light on the murder and were not taken into account in determining responsibility. No official from the Istanbul Police Department, which was found in all the reports to have failed to carry out the necessary work upon the intelligence it had received and, moreover, to have forged documents after the murder, was punished.
3
Court of Appeal's decision was ignored!
"In the investigations conducted after the murder, the meeting report dated 12.09.2006 and the news report mentioned in this report were concealed from all investigation authorities after the murder of Fırat (Hrant) Dink and these reports were destroyed..."
On 9 June 2022, the 2nd Criminal Chamber of the ISTANBUL REGIONAL Court of Appeals ruled that Faruk Sarı, Hasan Durmuşoğlu, Mehmet Ayhan, Mehmet Uçar, Onur Karakaya, Ramazan AKYÜREK and Ali Fuat Yılmazer, who were officers of the Trabzon Police Department, and Ramazan AKYÜREK and Ali Fuat Yılmazer, who were officers of the Department of Intelligence, were acquitted of the crime of distorting, destroying or concealing an official document.
The justification for this decision is as follows: “Since there is no evidence that the F4 document subject to the allegation was issued, what its content was, and if it was destroyed or concealed, by whom it was made or made to be made, the allegation could not be proven, the convictions of the court of first instance against the defendants in terms of this offense were annulled and the defendants were acquitted.”
Despite this, the Court of Cassation ignores the finalized decision of the Court of Appeal and persistently charges Akyürek and Yılmazer with concealing official documents.
There can be two explanations for this: Either the Court of Cassation made a copy-paste decision without examining the decision of the first instance court. Or this Court of Cassation, which did not recognize the Constitutional Court’s decision on Can Atalay, has committed yet another legal oddity. Or both…
Review of the Decision of the Court of Cassation
Sentence by sentence, we analyze the Court of Cassation's story about the Dink case, which is built with contradictory statements, illogical conclusions and baseless allegations.
The defendant RAMAZAN AKYÜREK;
- Although he was personally aware of the information that Fırat (Hrant) Dink would be killed by Yasin Hayal at all costs from the content of the communication dated 17.02.2006 and numbered 027246 and the interview report attached to it, which he sent with his signature to the Department of Intelligence of the General Directorate of Security during his duty as Trabzon Provincial Police Chief, after being appointed as the Head of the Department of Intelligence of the General Directorate of Security in May 2006, he accepted and approved in November 2006 the request of the Trabzon Provincial Police Intelligence Branch for the dismissal of Erhan Tuncel, who was the only auxiliary intelligence officer from whom the Police could obtain information on the murder plan. He did this despite the fact that it was foreseen even by simple reasoning that there would no longer be any source of information for the protection of the target; that he removed the obstacles to the commission of the murder with this dismissal process, even though he was aware of the intelligence information that he had signed and sent, which included precise information on the killing,
Failure to fulfill the obligation of notification to protect the right to life of Fırat (Hrant) Dink, who was in clear and imminent danger in line with intelligence,
That he failed to carry out operational activities against the group, that was to commit the murder, under the organization of the Department of Intelligence of the General Directorate of Security,
Since the target lived in Istanbul and the criminal organization that intended to commit the crime was located in Trabzon province, in such cases involving more than one province, the Department of Intelligence of the General Directorate of Security should have carried out an operation in Trabzon to arrest the group, that planned the attack, by acting as a kind of referee, and should have provided information to Istanbul to protect the target, but it failed to fulfil both of these obligations,
On 19.01.2007, immediately after the murder of Hrant Dink, he contacted Erhan Tuncel, who had been dismissed from his position as an auxiliary intelligence officer, through police personnel Muhittin Zenit and confirmed the information regarding the murder of Hrant Dink, but on the same day he left Istanbul by saying “I don’t know anything” to the officers of the Istanbul Provincial Police Department, who were working to investigate the murder and identify the perpetrators, and to Celalettin Cerrah, who asked him whether he had any information on this matter because he was the former Trabzon Police Chief,
As can be understood from the statements of Witness A. L., on 19.01.2007, he and co-defendant Ali Fuat Yılmazer had the Hrant Dink query page, which contained the information that an attack would be carried out by Yasin Hayal against Hrant Dink in the Department of Intelligence’s Intelligence Evaluation Program, closed,
- In the aftermath of the murder, during the investigation into the murder by the civil administration inspectors, his behavior, which appears to have been organized with the other defendants, in accordance with the communication sent by the Trabzon Provincial Police Intelligence Branch to the Istanbul Provincial Police Intelligence Branch, although it was determined that the Istanbul Provincial Police Intelligence Branch officers conducted a search on the phone number belonging to Yasin Hayal specified in the communication, With the letter dated 06.03.2008 sent by the defendant to the inspectors, the defendant tried to get rid of the responsibility and to show the Istanbul Provincial Police Intelligence Branch responsible by giving the information that “It is understood from the attached log records that no technical work was carried out by the Istanbul Provincial Police Intelligence Branch between 12.02.2006 and 19.01.2007, when the murder was committed, on the telephone line numbered 05387… used by Yasin Hayal, which was stated in the communication of Trabzon Intelligence Branch dated 17.02.2006”,
Despite the fact that all relevant information and documents were requested in the letter dated 16.02.2008 addressed to the Department of Intelligence by the experts Levent Yarımel and Durmuş Demirbaş, in order to conceal the responsibilities of some public officials in the C-2 Branch of the Department of Intelligence of the General Directorate of Security and Trabzon Provincial Police Intelligence Branch in the murder of Fırat (Hrant) Dink, He did not provide the requested information and documents, he did not give the expert Levent Yarımel, who contacted the Department of Intelligence with a letter dated 02.2008, the reports of the meetings with the auxiliary intelligence officer and the log records by saying “this letter will ruin us, what are you doing?”,
- According to the statements of the perpetrator Ogün Samast, he had supported and encouraged Yasin Hayal’s criminal organization before the murder,
- The other defendant Muharrem Demirkale, who was an Istanbul Provincial Gendarmerie officer at the time of the murder, and the other defendants whose responsibility is accepted, closely followed the perpetrator Ogün Samast, and the defendant had the whole murder process followed by the other defendants Ali Fuat Yılmazer and Muharrem Demirkale within the framework of organizational organization and division of labor,
- In the investigations carried out after the murder, the meeting report dated 12.09.2006 and the news report stated to have been prepared in this report were concealed from all investigation authorities from the date of the murder of Fırat (Hrant) Dink and these reports were destroyed,
- According to the statement of the other defendant Faruk Sarı, who was also the Trabzon Provincial Police Intelligence Branch Chief, he instructed “not to disclose the perpetrators of the murder of Fırat (Hrant) Dink and the role of the auxiliary intelligence officer Erhan Tuncel” to the Istanbul Police Department officials so that the responsibility for the murder of Hrant Dink would rest with the Istanbul Police Department,
- In order to ensure the appointment of Ali Fuat Yılmazer as the Chief of the Istanbul Provincial Police Intelligence Branch, which was seen as an obstacle to the Ergenekon and Balyoz operations planned by the organization and which was thought to be the center of the Ergenekon and Balyoz operations, Ahmet İlhan Güler, who was the Chief of the Istanbul Provincial Police Intelligence Branch at the time, called him to Ankara to the Department of Intelligence of the General Directorate of Security 6 days before the murder of Fırat (Hrant) Dink and asked him to leave Istanbul,
After Fırat (Hrant) Dink’s murder, the officers of the Department of Intelligence of the General Directorate of Security tried to link Fırat (Hrant) Dink’s murder to the Ergenekon investigation and tried to create evidence for this investigation,
the conclusion has been reached.
Defendant ALİ FUAT YILMAZER;
- The news report dated 15.02.2006, prepared upon being informed by the auxiliary intelligence officer Erhan Tuncel, contained the information that “Yasin Hayal will kill Hrant Dink at all costs”, and although he was the responsible chief of the branch in charge of ensuring that the action was prevented in advance by entering the information immediately into the Intelligence Evaluation Programme and the target persons programme and by implementing a planned intelligence operation, he did not do any of these things,
- Not even presenting the mentioned news reports to his superiors in charge, Vedat Yavuz, Necmettin Emre and Sabri Uzun, and having concealed them for organisational purposes, he prevented the implementation of the protection measures that should have been taken by the Department of Intelligence of the General Directorate of Security,
- On the other hand, in November 2006, Erhan Tuncel was requested to be dismissed from his duty as an auxiliary intelligence officer by the Head of the Department of Intelligence of the General Directorate of Security, and he, together with the other defendant Ramazan Akyürek, ensured the acceptance of this request; the approval for the dismissal of Erhan Tuncel from his duty as an auxiliary intelligence officer involved the knowledge and follow-up of the defendant and the department he was in charge of, and it could not be expected that this request would be accepted directly by the Head of the Department of Intelligence of the General Directorate of Security without the knowledge and approval of the C Branch which was responsible for the auxiliary intelligence officer who was the subject of the intelligence reports concerning the murder of Fırat (Hrant) Dink,
In addition, since the archive document of the aforementioned response letter could not be identified, even if it cannot be determined by which unit it was submitted for approval, the unit that provided this approval with its before and after procedures was the branch where the defendant was the director, it was no longer possible to receive news from the auxiliary intelligence officer who was dismissed in this way, and the purpose of the procedure was to ensure the actual realisation of the murder of the target person, - In May 2006, the other defendant Ramazan Akyürek, who was appointed as the Head of the Department of Intelligence of the General Directorate of Security, was in contact with the Trabzon Provincial Police Department, which was his previous office, and in this way, the defendant acted in co-operation and participated in all the acts carried out for the purpose together with the other defendant Ramazan Akyürek,
- In this context, after the perpetrator Ogün Samast, who was followed by Trabzon Provincial Police Intelligence Branch until the last moment, went to Istanbul 2 days before the murder, this time the perpetrator Ogün Samast was followed by the other defendant Muharrem Demirkale, who was wounded and captured during the clash with the law enforcement officers during the coup attempt of the organisation in 2016 and who participated in the coup attempt, and as it is fixed by the statements of the perpetrator Ogün Samast and other determinations within the scope of the file, the perpetrator Ogün Samast was followed by Istanbul Provincial Gendarmerie Intelligence officers at the scene of the murder on the day of the murder,
- Just before the murder, the perpetrator Ogün Samast called Yasin Hayal on the phone and told him that there were people following him in a black Renault car, to which Yasin Hayal replied that they were with us,
- That the other defendant Muharrem Demirkale and the defendant Ali Fuat Yılmazer had been in contact with each other for a long time,
- The people who followed the perpetrator, including on the day of the murder, were the elements under the command of the defendant Muharrem Demirkale, who was in contact with the defendant Ali Fuat Yılmazer, and this follow-up was carried out by the defendant Muharrem Demirkale; 10-15 minutes after the murder, the other defendant Muharrem Demirkale and the defendant Ali Fuat Yılmazer, who were very close to the scene of the murder, made a phone call and exchanged information about the murder,
- Within the framework of all these determinations, it has been established that the act of murder was followed by the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organisation, in which the defendant was also involved, and that the murder was designed to be committed,
- It is also evident from the statements of witness A. L., who worked at the same place, that the Intelligence Evaluation Programme was shut down after the murder, that the defendant Ali Fuat Yılmazer was in charge of the unit where this programme was registered, and that in this way the defendant tried to prevent the security units from being informed about the intelligence information available before the murder and thus to prevent the responsible persons, including himself, from being deciphered,
- Again, in June 2006, the C-5 Bureau, a secret unit, was formed in which the defendant Ali Fuat Yılmazer also contributed to the formation of the C-5 Bureau, which is a secret unit that operates illegally and outside the framework of the legislation; in the beginning, only sergeants and assistant sergeants worked in this secret unit in an isolated environment in a room where non-officer police personnel were prohibited from entering, and police officers were used only for fetching and transporting police officers, that they were not allowed to enter this room, that this bureau handled the murder of Hrant Dink, the murder of Priest Santora, the Zirve Publishing House murders, the Ergenekon and Balyoz investigations and all the events that took an important place in the country’s agenda, and that the groundwork for the planned Ergenekon, Balyoz and similar operations was prepared here, was understood from dozens of documents that were recorded in the secret bureau in question,
- After the murder, Coşgun Çakar and Ramazan Akyürek, who were the managers of the Department of Intelligence, ensured that the defendant Ali Fuat Yılmazer was appointed in place of Ahmet İlhan Güler, whom they wanted to remove from the position of Istanbul Provincial Police Department Intelligence Branch within the scope of the consensus of Coşgun Çakar and Ramazan Akyürek, by means of reports that were prepared in a way that did not reflect the truth thanks to some documents that were hidden and eliminated in order to prevent their responsibility by claiming that the Istanbul Provincial Police Department was negligent,
- The defendant also put pressure on the inspectors of the Prime Ministry afterwards and made statements such as “Instead of having Hrant Dink’s murder investigated, the Prime Minister should support the Ergenekon case”, displayed preventive attitudes due to the fear that his responsibilities would be revealed, and did not allow the inspectors to meet with the people they wanted to meet,
- In addition, in the interview report dated 12.09.2006, which contains detailed statements of the auxiliary intelligence officer Erhan Tuncel before he was dismissed from his duty as auxiliary intelligence officer in November 2006, which was concealed or destroyed and therefore could not be revealed, this report was concealed or destroyed, even though the defendant was also aware of the intelligence information about who would commit the murder by whom and against whom,
- Again, the other report dated 15.02. 2006 was sent to the Istanbul Provincial Police Department in a manner different from the original report and the content of the interview with the auxiliary intelligence officer was not sent as an attachment; therefore, no action could be taken by the Istanbul Provincial Police Department to take Hrant Dink under protection, In this way, since the sending of the content of the interview with the auxiliary intelligence officer Erhan Tuncel involved actions involving 2 different provinces, the Istanbul Provincial Police Department was not provided with information about the interview with the auxiliary intelligence officer, while the Department of Intelligence of the General Directorate of Security should have provided all the information to both provinces by acting as a referee, so to speak, in accordance with the current practice,
- No one other than the members of the organisation was given information to anyone else in charge at the Department of Intelligence of the General Directorate of Security, and the murder was carried out by Yasin Hayal and his group, which is a criminal organisation within the scope of FETÖ/PDY’s organisational organisation and division of labour, together with the other defendants who were found to be responsible for the murder, by concealing the information about the murder that would lead to the orientation and self-disclosure of the information obtained.
Sanık MUHARREM DEMİRKALE‘nin;
- Olay tarihlerinde İstanbul İl Jandarma İstihbarat Şube Müdürlüğü Bölücü Örgüt Faaliyetleri TİM Komutanı Yüzbaşı olan sanığın, FETÖ/PDY silahlı terör örgütü mensupları tarafından gerçekleştirilen 15 Temmuz 2016 tarihli darbe girişimi esnasında Ankara’da Jandarma Genel Komutanlığı binasında darbeciler tarafında Yarbay olarak yer aldığı,
- Ayrıca dosya kapsamı itibariyle Fırat (Hrant) Dink cinayetinin tasarlanması ve organizasyonu sürecine de katıldığı,
- Trabzon İl Jandarma İstihbarat görevlileri Okan Şimşek, Gazi Günay ve Ergün Yorulmaz’ın 09.08.2006 tarihinde Fırat (Hrant) Dink’in Bakırköy ilçesinde bulunan konutu ve sahibi olduğu Beyaz Adam Yayıncılık ünvanlı iş yerinin çevresinde keşif faaliyetinde bulundukları, bu keşif faaliyeti sırasında Trabzon’dan gelen ekibin, sanık Muharrem Demirkale ile de irtibatlı olduğu, bu dönemde sanık Muharrem Demirkale’nin Hrant Dink’in Bakırköy ilçesinde bulunan konutunun yakınlarına gittiğinin HTS kayıtları ve sinyal bilgilerinden tespit edildiği,
- Ayrıca sanığın cinayet günü olay yerinde bulunan Trabzon İl Jandarma İstihbarat görevlilerini koordine ettiği,
- Bu kapsamda HTS tespit tutanak içerikleri incelendiğinde; Hrant Dink cinayetinden önce keşif amacı ile Trabzon İl Jandarma İstihbarat görevlilerinin İstanbul’a geldiği, bu bağlamda İstanbul’da yapılacak olan keşfin hemen 2 gün öncesinde 07.08.2006 tarihinde saat 11:33’te Trabzon İl Jandarma İstihbarat görevlisi diğer sanık Okan Şimşek ile İstanbul İl Jandarma Komutanlığı İstihbarat Şube Müdürlüğü Bölücü Faaliyetler TİM Komutanı sanık Muharrem Demirkale’nin telefonda görüştüğünün tespit edildiği,
- Ayrıca sanık Muharrem Demirkale’nin kullanımında bulunan 05052… numaralı hattın cinayet günü olan 19.01.2007 tarihine ait HTS kayıtları incelendiğinde; saat 11:03:44’te Ecevit Emir ile 119 saniye süren bir görüşme yaptığı, bu görüşme sırasında Büyükdere Caddesi No: 13 Tahir Ağa Çeşme Sokak Ayazağa İş Merkezi Maslak/İstanbul adresinden baz verdiği, saat 12:14:14’te Ali Göral Gümüşdere ile 14 saniye süren bir görüşme yaptığı, bu görüşme sırasında Büyükdere Caddesi No: 13 Tahir Ağa Çeşme Sokak Ayazağa İş Merkezi Maslak/İstanbul adresinden baz verdiği, saat 12:40:00’da Veli Ateş ile 42 saniye süren bir görüşme yaptığı, bu görüşme sırasında Nispetiye Caddesi No: 6 Levent/İstanbul adresinden baz verdiği, saat 14:24:33’te Aycan Oktaylar ile 350 saniye süren bir görüşme yaptığı, bu görüşme sırasında Dikilitaş Mahallesi Barbaros Bulvarı Balmumcu/İstanbul adresinden baz verdiği, saat 14:35:37’de Emre Cingöz ile 215 saniye süren bir görüşme yaptığı, bu görüşme sırasında TEK Zincirlikuyu Trafo Binası Müselles Sokak No: 40 Zincirlikuyu/İstanbul adresinden baz verdiği, saat 14:38:24’te Ahmet Gökhan Kayacan ile 34 saniye süren bir görüşme yaptığı, bu görüşme sırasında Nispetiye Caddesi No: 6 Levent/İstanbul adresinden baz verdiği, saat 15:17:03’te Aylin Erkin ile 1 saniye süren bir görüşme yaptığı, bu görüşme sırasında Nispetiye Caddesi No: 6 Levent/İstanbul adresinden baz verdiği, saat 15:27:10’da Ecevit Emir ile 45 saniye süren bir görüşme yaptığı, bu görüşme sırasında Nispetiye Caddesi No: 6 Levent/İstanbul adresinden baz verdiği, saat 15:32:46’da Emre Cingöz ile 38 saniye süren bir görüşme yaptığı, bu görüşme sırasında Afet Yolal Camii Şerifi Levent Caddesi Sümbül Sokak Etiler/İstanbul adresinden baz verdiği, saat 15:34:27’de Metin Canbay ile 123 saniye süren bir görüşme yaptığı, bu görüşme sırasında Nispetiye Caddesi No: 6 Levent/İstanbul adresinden baz verdiği, saat 15:40:25’te Yavuz Karakaya ile 25 saniye süren bir görüşme yaptığı, bu görüşme sırasında Nispetiye Caddesi No: 6 Levent/İstanbul adresinden baz verdiği, saat 15:44:13’te Adem Sarıgöl ile 43 saniye süren bir görüşme yaptığı, bu görüşme sırasında Esentepe Mahallesi Kore Şehitleri Caddesi Çizik Han No:33/5 Şişli/İstanbul adresinden baz verdiği, saat 15:46:25’te Menderes Çimen adına kayıtlı Ali Fuat Yılmazer tarafından kullanılan hat ile 44 saniye süren bir görüşme yaptığı, bu görüşme sırasında Esentepe Mahallesi Kore Şehitleri CaddesiÇizik Han No: 33/5 Şişli/İstanbul adresinden baz verdiği, saat 16:06:19’da Erdal Turna ile 129 saniye süren bir görüşme yaptığı, bu görüşme sırasında Nispetiye Caddesi No: 6 Levent/İstanbul adresinden baz verdiği, saat 16:41:32’da Erol Demirhan ile 39 saniye süren bir görüşme yaptığı, bu görüşme sırasında Nispetiye Caddesi No: 6 Levent/İstanbul adresinden baz verdiği, saat 16:42:29’da Metin Canbay ile 134 saniye süren bir görüşme yaptığı, bu görüşme sırasında Nispetiye Caddesi No: 6 Levent/İstanbul adresinden baz verdiği, saat 16:47:36’da Ali Barış Sevindik ile 25 saniye süren bir görüşme yaptığı, bu görüşme sırasında Esentepe Mahallesi Kore Şehitleri Caddesi Çizik Han No: 33/5 Şişli/İstanbul adresinden baz verdiği, Muharrem Demirkale’nin 05052… numaralı hattı üzerinden FETÖ/PDY silahlı terör örgütüne üye olma suçundan meslekten ihraç edilen eski özel yetkili firari Cumhuriyet savcısı Zekeriya Öz adına kayıtlı 05052… numaralı hatla cinayetten 1 gün önce 18.01.2007 tarihinde 3 kez, Fırat (Hrant) Dink cinayetinden 1 gün sonra 20.01.2007 tarihinde 2 kez olmak üzere toplam 5 kez görüşme yaptığı,
- Yine Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü İstihbarat Daire Başkanlığı C Şube Müdürü olarak görev yapan ve Menderes Çimen adına kayıtlı telefon hattını kullanan Ali Fuat Yılmazer, İstanbul Emniyet Müdürlüğü’nde görevli Müdür ve Müdür Yardımcıları Erol Demirhan ve Metin Canbay ile telefon irtibatlarının bulunduğu, sanığın 17.01.2007, 18.01.2007 ve 21.01.2007 tarihlerinde İspanya ülkesinden bir telefon numarasından ve Ekim 2006-Mart 2007 tarihleri arasında Zimbabwe ülkesindeki bir numaradan mesaj aldığı,
- İstanbul İl Jandarma Komutanlığı tarafından dosyaya gönderilen İstanbul İl Jandarma Komutanlığı İstihbarat Personeli Görevlendirme Kayıt Defteri incelendiğinde; sanık Muharrem Demirkale’ye Abdullah Dinç’in şoförlüğünde cinayet günü olan 19.01.2007 tarihinde saat 12:15-15:00 arasında Jandarma Bölge Komutanlığı Dispanseri’ne muayene için Beşiktaş-Balmumcu bölgesine görevlendirme yazıldığı, olay yeri ile Beşiktaş Balmumcu’daki Jandarma tesisinin çok yakın yerlerde bulundukları, Abdullah Dinç’in beyanında; ”sanık Muharrem Demirkale’nin hasta olduğunu beyan ettiği için kendisini Beşiktaş-Balmumcu adresine bıraktığını, görevlendirme yazısını yazmadığını, Muharrem Demirkale’nin komutanı da olması nedeniyle talimatı ile kendisini Beşiktaş-Balmumcu’ya bıraktığını” beyan ettiği,
- Sanığın 19.01.2007 tarihli HTS kayıtlarına göre sanığın kullanımındaki numaranın sabah saatlerinden itibaren akşam geç saatlere kadar Maslak, Levent, Şişli ve Zincirlikuyu’da bulunan baz istasyonlarından sinyal aldığının tespit edildiği, bu tespitle sanığın hasta olduğunu beyan ettiği halde, sabit bir adreste dinlenmediğinin görüldüğü,
- Baz kayıtları incelendiğinde cinayet saatinden hemen sonra sanığın, Yavuz Karakaya, Ali Fuat Yılmazer, Erol Demirhan, Metin Canbay gibi örgüt mensupları ile telefon irtibatının bulunduğu,
- HTS kayıtları göz önüne alındığında sanığın ”ağır hastaydım” şeklindeki savunmasının gerçeği yansıtmadığı, yine görevlendirme defterindeki görevlendirme yazısının da gerçeği yansıtmadığı, sonradan doldurulduğu,
- Hasta olan bir kişinin kendisine görevlendirme yazmasının hayatın olağan akışına aykırı olduğu, şayet bir hastalık söz konusu ise mazeret izninin talep edilmesi gerektiği, dolayısı ile görevlendirme yazısının bu yönüyle de gerçeği yansıtmadığı, sanığın olay mahalline gitmek için bu tür bir senaryo tertip ettiği,
- Fırat (Hrant) Dink’in öldürüleceğine dair istihbari bilginin 2006 yılında yardımcı istihbarat elemanı Erhan Tuncer’den alındığı ve bu konuda görüşme raporları hazırlanarak Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü İstihbarat Daire Başkanlığı’na bildirildiği, yine Coşkun İğci tarafından da Trabzon Jandarma İstihbarat görevlilerine cinayetin işleneceğinin bildirildiği,
- Trabzon İl Jandarma İstihbarat görevlilerinin İstanbul’da yapmış oldukları keşif tarihinde cinayetin işleneceğini bildikleri, Trabzon İl Jandarma İstihbarat görevlisi olan ve İstanbul’a keşfe gelen Okan Şimşek’in HTS kayıtları incelendiğinde İstanbul İl Jandarma İstihbarat görevlisi olan Astsubay Kıdemli Başçavuş Şeref Ateş ve sanık Muharrem Demirkale ile irtibatta olduğu,
- Firari eski Cumhuriyet savcısı Zekeriya Öz ile bu sıklıkla telefon iletişiminin olmasının da hayatın olağan akışına aykırı olduğu, olay tarihinden bir gün öncesi ve bir gün sonrası görüşmelerinin rastlantı ile izahının mümkün olmadığı, üst düzey örgüt mensupları olan Zekeriya Öz, Ali Fuat Yılmazer, Metin Canbay ve Erol Demirhan ile sanığın olay tarihlerinde görüşmesinin normal olmadığı ve örgütsel amaçlı olduğu,
- Sanık Muharrem Demirkale’nin cinayet gününe, öncesine ve sonrasına ait iletişim ve baz bilgilerinin, sanığın cinayetin her safhasından haberdar olduğunu, cinayetin öncesinde ve sonrasında sorumluluğu kabul edilen diğer sanıkların koordinesini sağladığını gösterdiği,
- Örgüt mensupları ile yaptığı görüşmelerin planlama, bilgilendirme ve bilgi edinme amaçlı yapıldığı, bu görüşmelerin cinayet öncesi planlama ve cinayet sonrası gelişecek olaylar ile ilgili gerçekleştirildiği, dolayısıyla bir organizasyonun ve planlama sürecinin olduğunun kabul edildiği,
- Emre Cingöz’ün beyanında; ”sanık Muharrem Demirkale’nin Eylül 2005 ila Eylül 2008 arasında bağlı bulunduğu birimde TİM Komutanlığı yaptığını, onun da Ali Barış Sevindik’e bağlı olduğunu, ancak Muharrem Demirkale’nin farklı özelliğinin o zamana kadar yok sayılabilecek nitelikte olan Emniyet ve MİT’le görev diyaloglarını üst seviyede tutmak olduğunu” beyan ettiği,
- Yine Yusuf Bozca’nın beyanında; ”sanık Muharrem Demirkale’nin MİT, Emniyet, Cumhuriyet savcısı, Paşa gibi üst rütbelilerle devamlı irtibat halinde olduğunu, aynı birimde görev yapan bazı personellere sanığın özel ilgi gösterdiğini, bazı işleri sadece bu personellere yaptırdığını, kendinden rütbece küçük Şeref Ateş ve Yavuz Karakaya’ya abi diye hitap ettiğini, Muharrem Demirkale’nin ve onunla aynı görüşe sahip olan TSK personellerinin Hrant Dink cinayetinin işlenmesinde dahili olduklarını düşündüğünü” beyan ettiği,
- Dosya sanığı olan ancak yargılama esnasında vefat eden Şeref Ateş’in cinayet tarihi olan 19.01.2007’deki HTS kayıtları incelendiğinde 19.01.2007 tarihinde saat 13:01:12’de Şeref Ateş’in kullanımında bulunan 05052… numaralı hattına Zimbabwe ülkesine ait olan 2639… numaralı uluslararası hattan mesaj aldığı, cinayetin planlanması ve icrası aşamalarında diğer sanık Okan Şimşek ile Şeref Ateş ve sanık Muharrem Demirkale’nin iletişim halinde oldukları,
- Olay günü sanık Şeref Ateş’in devamlı olarak sanık Muharrem’in TİM Komutanı olduğu birimin unsur elemanları ile irtibatta olduğu,
- Sanık Muharrem Demirkale, Yavuz Karakaya ile Şeref Ateş’in cinayetin gerçekleşmesinde beraber hareket ettikleri,
- Sanık Şeref’in dikkat çekmemek adına dolaylı yollardan sanık Muharrem’e ulaşıp, koordineyi sağladığı,
- Sanık Muharrem Demirkale’nin Fırat (Hrant) Dink cinayetinin işlendiği tarihte İstanbul İstihbarat Şube Müdürlüğü Bölücü Faaliyetler TİM Komutanı olarak görev yaptığı,
- Diğer sanıklar İstanbul İl Jandarma İstihbarat görevlileri Yavuz Karakaya ve Bekir Yokuş’un da görev kayıt defterine göre farklı yerlerde bulunmaları gerekirken cinayet mahalli ve çevresinde bulunduklarının cep telefonu sinyal baz bilgileri ile tespit edildiği,
- Bu tespitlerin sanıkların organizeli şekilde hareket ettiklerini ortaya koyduğu,
- Sanığın 1990’lı yıllardan itibaren örgüt içinde bulunduğuna ilişkin birçok tanık beyanı bulunduğu,
- Azınlıklar ile Türk vatandaşlar arasında suni bir gerginlik ve bu gerginlikle birlikte güvensizlik ortamının oluşturulması, bu ortamın uluslararası alanda da gündeme gelmesi, olanların sorumlusu olarak AK Parti Hükümeti’nin gösterilmesinin ve yıpratılmasının amaçlandığı,
- Sanık Muharrem Demirkale’nin de içinde bulunduğu İstanbul ve Trabzon Jandarma İstihbarat görevlileri tarafından cinayet tarihinden önce Fırat (Hrant) Dink’in ev ve iş yerlerinde keşiflerin yapıldığı,
- Cinayet günü ise fail Ogün Samast’ın an ve an takibinin yapılması ile cinayetin işlendiği,
- Cinayetin öncesinde ve sonrasında sanık Muharrem Demirkale tarafından Jandarma ve Emniyet İstihbarat görevlileri ve firari eski Cumhuriyet savcısı Zekeriya Öz ile iletişim kurularak cinayetin işlenmesi ve sonuçları hakkında değerlendirme yaptığı,
- Sanığın cinayet saatinde iş yerinde değil Balmumcu’da olduğu anlaşılmakla,
- Tüm bu hususlar birlikte değerlendirildiğinde sanığın bu cinayetin işlenmesinde koordinasyonu sağladığı, cinayetin faili olan Ogün Samast’ın beyanında; ”…İstanbul’a gerçekten tek başıma geldim. İstanbul’a geldikten sonra otogardan dayımın evine gittim bir gece kaldım. Olay günü Şişli’ye gittim ve adresi buldum. Bir internet kafe aradım, o sırada Halaskargazi Caddesine ve sanırsam sonradan öğrendiğim kadarı ile Şafak Sokak’ta iki şahsın beni takip ettiğini ve sürekli benimle birlikte hareket ettiklerini gördüm. Bunun üzerine oradaki ankesörlü telefondan Yasin Hayal’in telefonunu aradım, abi beni takip edenler var, polis var sanki arkamda dedim, Yasin bilmiş ve kendinden emin bir şekilde bana olabilir, onlar bizden dedi…” şeklinde beyanda bulunduğu,
- İstanbul Jandarma Komutanlığı görevlendirme defterinde sanıklar Muharrem Demirkale ile Abdullah Dinç’e cinayet günü olan 19.01.2007 günü saat 12:15-15:00 arasında Jandarma Bölge Komutanlığı Dispanseri’nde muayene için Beşiktaş-Balmumcu bölgesine görevlendirme yazıldığı, bu sayede sanık Muharrem Demirkale’nin cinayet saatinde Beşiktaş-Balmumcu adresinde olduğu ve bu yerin, cinayetin gerçekleştiği yere çok yakın olduğu,
- Yine İstanbul İl Jandarma İstihbarat Şube Müdürlüğü’nün istihbarat personeli görevlendirme kayıt defterine göre 19.01.2007 günü saat 10.30 ila 18.00 saatleri arasında diğer sanıklar Bekir Yokuş ile Yavuz Karakaya’nın Renault Clio Symbol araç ile Beykoz ve Kartal’da görevli olduğunun belirtildiği, baz kayıtları ve HTS kayıtları tetkik edildiğinde ise 19.01.2007 günü diğer sanık Yavuz Karakaya’nın saat 13:43 ila 13:52 civarında Adnan Menderes Bulvarı Topkapı çevresindeki baz istasyonlarından sinyal verdiği, saat 15:40’a kadar baz sinyali vermediği, aynı şekilde diğer sanık Bekir Yokuş’un telefonunun da saat 11:48:25 ila 17:38:44 arasında baz sinyali vermediğinin tespit edildiği, diğer sanık Bekir Yokuş ile birlikte göreve çıkan diğer sanık Yavuz Karakaya’nın HTS kayıtlarına göre 15:40:25’te Muharrem Demirkale ile 25 saniye süren bir görüşme yaptığı, olayın olduğu saatte birlikte göreve çıkan sanıklar Bekir Yokuş ve Yavuz Karakaya’nın aynı anda telefonlarının kapalı olmasının rastlantıyla izahının mümkün olmadığı,
- Sanıkların olay saatinde telefonlarını kapalı tutmalarındaki amacın, baz ve HTS kayıtlarına göre yerlerinin tespit edilmesini önlemek olduğu, yine diğer sanık Yavuz Karakaya’nın cinayetin hemen sonrasında sanık Muharrem Demirkale’yi aramasının da bu koordinenin sanık Muharrem Demirkale tarafından yapıldığını ortaya koyduğu kanaatine varılmıştır.
Who sits on the Court of Cassation Panel?
The 3rd Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation consists of the president Muhsin Şentürk and member judges Hakan Yüksel, Ali Nevzat Açıkgöz, Nazım Durmaz and Oğuz Dik.
This chamber did not recognize the Constitutional Court’s “violation of rights” ruling on Can Atalay’s release and prevented its implementation. For the first time in Turkey, the decision of the Constitutional Court was not recognized by another judicial body (the Court of Cassation) within the legal system. A criminal complaint was filed against the judges who issued the verdict.
Another striking feature of the panel is that the entire chamber chaired by Muhsin Şentürk is composed of members of the AKP-backed Unity in the Judiciary Platform. Member judge Ali Nevzat Açıkgöz is currently the chairman of the Unity in Judiciary Platform.(January 2024)
Nearly all of the cases upheld after July 15 by the chamber where Muhsin Şentürk served as president were found to be in violation of rights by the ECHR. This shows that the court, which acts in line with the political interests of the AKP, makes political rather than legal evaluations. (Yalçınkaya v. Turkey)
Following the recent appointments of members of the panel to the Court of Cassation, a news article was published in the Anatolian news agency with the headline “Judges who actively fought against the Gülen movement were appointed to the Court of Cassation”.
The fact that the criteria for appointment to this chamber is the active fight against the Gülen movement has led to the assessment that it is a political body rather than a court.
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